This essay has two complementary purposes. It seeks principally to clarify the basis of the political philosophy of Richard Hooker, the great Elizabethan divine, and, in so doing, to clarify as well certain of the limits of political speculation itself. We hear quite often now that reports of the death of political philosophy have been greatly exaggerated. If this is indeed a time of its resuscitation, it is important that its limits be recognized and that inquiry be liberated from doctrines which cannot be based on unassisted reason alone. The ancillary purpose of this study is a contribution to such a disentanglement.

Hooker's political thought itself also repays the attention of modern political scientists, if only as a remarkably comprehensive model of pre-modern or “traditional” society. Hooker wrestles with one of the difficulties which had much to do with ending “traditional” society in Europe and in those places Europe has influenced: the bitter and conflicting claims of church and state, and especially of various churches. Hooker's is a revealing endeavor to solve the political problems inherent in revealed religion, without abandoning—as his “enlightened” successors did—Christianity as a decisive constituent of politics or Aristotle as the secular guide of politics.

“A treaty entering the Senate is like a bull going into the arena; no one can say just how or when the final blow will fall—but one thing is certain—it will never leave the arena alive.” When John Hay put this in his diary he had been secretary of state for six years. During this period he had seen seventeen treaties borne from the Senate, lifeless or so mutilated by amendments that they could not survive. We can pardon the harassed secretary's earlier statement. “The fact that a treaty gives to this country a great, lasting advantage, seems to weigh nothing whatever in the minds of about half the Senators. Personal interest, personal spites, and a contingent chance of petty political advantage are the only motives that cut any ice at present.”

It is, however, with the objective aspect of Secretary Hay's statement that we are primarily concerned. Statesmen, as others, may occasionally express impatience, but if the practical function of the Senate in treaty making is that of the matador at a bull fight, there are more serious grounds for concern. If its duties resemble those of picadors or banderilleros, the matter is serious enough, and of its goading tactics we have early evidence. Thus, John Quincy Adams writes in his diary: “Mr. Crawford told twice over the story of President Washington's having at an early period of his Administration gone to the Senate with a project of a treaty to be negotiated, and been present at their deliberations upon it. They debated it and proposed alterations, so that when Washington left the Senate-chamber he said he would be damned if he ever went there again. And ever since that time treaties have been negotiated by the Executive before submitting them to the consideration of the Senate.”

In spite of the recent loosening of the membership or affiliation requirements in Illinois and a few other states, the general tendency throughout the development of party regulation has been toward greater strictness in this respect, toward more effective protection of the party organization against the independent voter with a careless party conscience. This is indicated, in the first place, by the turn toward an official definition and administration of these membership tests. That is, the parties are no longer left free to determine their own membership rules as they please, but these rules are to an increasing extent prescribed by state law and administered by state officials. Secondly, the tests of party membership have become, on the whole, more complex and more comprehensive, and therefore more difficult to evade—the closed primary has become more and more tightly closed. Thirdly, there has been a drift from the challenge to the enrollment or registration system, and, in general, legislation or other official action which requires greater care by the voter and the candidate in the selection of his party, and which imposes greater difficulty in changing his party affiliation.

The importance of citizen trust in government derives from its role in democratic theory. Presumably, the decisions of trusted authorities and institutions are more likely to be accepted as legitimate and worthy of support than are those of distrusted leaders and institutions.

In just 13 pages, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes's “Constituency Influence in Congress” established the agenda for the next half-century of research on congressional representation. Along with its sister paper, “Party Government and the Salience of Congress” (Stokes and Miller 1962), “Constituency Influence” famously documents the general impoverishment of voters' knowledge of Congress and its members. Of at least equal importance is its analysis of congressional behavior as a response to oft-ambiguous constituency views, incorporating rich interview data of the sort not seen since. It is no wonder that Miller and Stokes' paper is among the most heavily cited—and influential—of all papers that have graced the pages of the Review.