How does politics affect, and possibly distort, how resources are allocated? I show that where the federal government provides public goods and financial assistance depends not only on who has power within Congress but also on the characteristics of their constituents. In a federal system like the United States, the central government provides resources by allocating grants to subnational governments based on demographic characteristics. Thus, to maximize funding for their states, members of Congress must also distribute funding to states with similar characteristics. Using panel data on education spending and a difference-in-differences design, I demonstrate that grants disproportionately benefit states represented by Senate committee chairs, but this benefit spills over to similar states. However, I find no evidence of committee influence over grants in the House. These findings contribute to our understanding of distributive politics and shed light on the consequences of allocating resources within a federal system.

We leverage plausibly exogenous variation in regional exposure to corruption to provide causal estimates of the impact of local political corruption on terrorist activity for a sample of 175 countries between 1970 and 2018. We find that higher levels of corruption lead to more terrorism. This result is robust to a variety of empirical modifications, including various ways in which we probe the validity of our instrumental variables approach. We also show that corruption adversely affects the provision of public goods and undermines counter-terrorism capacity. Thus, our empirical findings are consistent with predictions from a game-theoretical representation of terrorism, according to which corruption makes terrorism relatively more attractive compared to peaceful contestation, while also decreasing the costs of organizing and carrying out terrorist attacks.

Since 2010, independent expenditures have grown as a source of spending in American elections. A large and growing portion comes from “dark money” groups—political nonprofits whose terms of incorporation allow them to partially obscure their sources of income. I develop a new dataset of about 2,350,000 tax documents released by the IRS and use it to test a new theory of political spending. I posit that pathways for anonymous giving allowed interest groups to form new networks and create new pathways for money into candidate races apart from established political parties. Akin to networked party organizations discovered by other scholars, these dark money networks channel money from central hubs to peripheral electioneering groups. I further show that accounting for these dark money networks makes previously peripheral nodes more important to the larger network and diminishes the primacy of party affiliated organizations in funneling money into candidate races.

A long-standing debate in political psychology considers whether individuals update their beliefs and attitudes in the direction of evidence or grow more confident in their convictions when confronted with counter-attitudinal arguments. Though recent studies have shown that instances of the latter tendency, which scholars have termed attitude polarization and “belief backfire,” are rarely observed in settings involving hot-button issues or viral misinformation, we know surprisingly little about how participants respond to information targeting deeply held attitudes, a key condition for triggering attitude polarization. We develop a tailored experimental design that measures participants’ core issue positions and exposes them to personalized counter-attitudinal information using the large language model GPT-3. We find credible evidence of attitude polarization, but only when arguments are contentious and vitriolic. For lower valence counter-attitudinal arguments, attitude polarization is not detected. We conclude by discussing implications for the study of political cognition and the measurement of attitudes.

We mentioned in the previous issue the approaching end of our term as editors, and the American Political Science Association (APSA) Council—acting on recommendations of a search committee (chair: Joan Tronto) and President Carole Pateman—has now chosen our successors: another editorial team, based at the University of North Texas, and consisting of Professors Val Martinez-Ebers, John Ishiyama, Marijke Breuning, and Steve Forde. We look forward to passing the baton to this next group and will work, as Professor Lee Sigelman did with our group, to make the transition as seamless as possible. We expect them, following past practice, to offer a statement of editorial policy in the May 2012 issue of this journal.

That there was a continuity between medieval political thought and the body of systematic theory that surrounded the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution is by now a commonplace. But when we speak of the medieval contribution to the American political tradition, it is important to avoid the implication that what medieval thought contributed was identical with what American thought received. Between the close of the fifteenth century and the latter part of the eighteenth lie some two and a half centuries of crowded thought and experience, which more or less profoundly changed the meaning of concepts continuously in use. The more we learn of medieval theory, the clearer it becomes that it must be interpreted in its own terms rather than in terms of its derivatives. And the American political tradition, of course, cannot be fully understood in terms of its historic roots. Perhaps the chief service which the history of ideas can offer to political theory lies in providing material for the sharpening of concepts through a comparative analysis. For the full understanding of the meaning of an idea, one needs to know not only what it is, but also, I suggest, what it is not. Thus there may be value in an attempt to define the medieval meaning of some concepts that were a significant part of the medieval contribution: in particular, sovereignty, natural law and natural rights, and consent.

The Illinois Constitution of 1870 prohibited the State legislature from enacting local or special laws incorporating cities, towns, or villages, or changing or amending the charter of any town, city, or village. In 1872 an act was passed, providing for the government of all cities in the State of Illinois. In 1875 Chicago abandoned its special charter, and accepted the provisions of the general law of 1872. This law, with a series of amendments, has continued for a generation as the fundamental law of the city of Chicago. The very rapid growth of the city, however, in territory, in population, and in the complexity of its municipal interests has rendered the law of 1872 wholly inadequate for the present needs of the great metropolis. Widespread agitation in regard to this subject led to the initiation, in 1903, of a constitutional amendment authorizing the State legislature to enact special laws regarding the government of Chicago, providing that such laws should not go into effect until approved by the voters of Chicago. This amendment was adopted by the people of Illinois in November, 1904, after a vigorous campaign had been carried on in its favor by the citizens of Chicago. The legislature of 1905 met very shortly after the adoption of this act, so that a complete charter could not be presented to them. A bill providing for a new system of municipal courts, and abolishing the old “justice shops,” was prepared, however, by a citizens' committee; was presented to the legislature, and passed. A committee of the city council also drew up a proposed charter for the city, which was introduced into the State legislature, but of which only a small fragment was finally enacted. The term of the mayor was extended from two years to four; provisions were made enabling the city to secure the interest on its public deposits; and some other minor powers were contained in this rump charter. These acts were voted upon in November, 1905, and approved by the people. So far, however, as comprehensive legislation was concerned, very little had been accomplished, except the establishment of the new courts.

Steady progress in the improvement of the processes of public administration marked the year 1928, but possibly of even greater significance has been the development of research interest in administrative problems by organized bodies of public officials. The greatest hope for realization of higher standards of performance necessarily lies in the body of officials who are responsible for the conduct of public business, and their new interest in research as a means of discovery of improved methods is of great significance. Among the groups of officials who are breaking new ground in this direction are the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the International City Managers' Association, the reorganized Civil Service Assembly, and some state leagues of municipalities. The appointment of four research fellows by the New York State Tax Department is also full of interest. Specific reference to some phases of their work will be made in the following paragraphs.

Academic interest in research in this field has also been exceptional. During the year Dr. W. F. Willoughby prepared for the Policy Committee of the American Political Science Association a survey of the institutions carrying on studies in public administration, and during the year also the Problems and Policy Committee of the Social Science Research Council appointed a special Advisory Committee on Research in Public Administration, the chairman of which is Professor Leonard D. White, of the University of Chicago. Other committees of the Social Science Research Council also have dealt with special phases of administration, especially the Advisory Committee on Industrial Relations and the Advisory Committee on Social and Economic Research in Agriculture.