Since Converse (1964) first proposed his “nonattitudes hypothesis,” numerous studies have confirmed that the public at large lacks ideologically consistent political attitudes. I put forth an event-based theory of attitude crystallization that explains how elections can strengthen attitude consistency and apply it to an issue domain integral to the left-right (liberal-conservative) cleavage: welfare politics. Specifically, I theorize that elections that give ideological opponents a majority will mobilize ideological predispositions, leading to more coherent welfare attitudes. I test the argument by relying on 11 Danish surveys linked to official records on local elections over four decades and using a regression discontinuity design. Evidence strongly supports the notion that elections increase attitude consistency if the majority produced goes against the individual’s ideological preferences. The findings stress the dynamic nature of attitude structure and the important role regular political events play in that regard.

Recent challenges to traditional approaches and purposes for studying the history of political theory have raised questions about its constitution as both a subject matter and subfield of political science. Methodological arguments advocating what is characterized as a more truly historical mode of inquiry for understanding political ideas and recovering textual meaning have become increasingly popular. The relationship of these hermeneutical claims about historicity, such as that advanced by Quentin Skinner, to the actual practice of interpretation is problematical. Such claims are more a defense of a certain norm of historical investigation than a method of interpretation, and the implications of this norm for the reconstitution of the history of political theory require careful consideration.

An important and clearly marked recent trend in American government is that in the direction of systematic planning—local, state, and national. City planning has developed for the last twenty years, and there are now some 700 city planning agencies. The activities of these boards have been halted somewhat during the depression, although some 9,000 workers under the C.W.A. aided in the development of city plans in 1934. On the whole, the cities have fallen behind in the movement they started.

The most significant single event in the urban field is the establishment of a new type of planning agency in Cincinnati, known as the department of economic security, an office through which the employment and reëmployment problems of that community are made the subject of governmental study and action, in cooperation with industry. The director is a man of wide experience and broad social vision in the person of Colonel Waite, one time city manager of Dayton and recently deputy administrator of public works

Election officials often say that many Americans do not register to vote for fear of being called to jury duty. The only published study on the topic claims that aversion to jury service depresses turnout by more than seven percentage points. We use questions from the 1991 National Election Studies Pilot Study to ascertain beliefs about the sources of jury lists, and we relate those impressions to registration status. We find that barely half the public professes any knowledge of how juries are chosen, and just 42% believe that they come from voter registration records. Estimations from a multivariate analysis indicate that fear of jury service accounts for less than a one percentage point drop in turnout. We discuss the implications of this finding both for reform proposals and the rational choice theory of turnout.

When the Labour Government began to nationalize industries in Great Britain, swarms of social scientists descended upon that island. They wanted to study this “great experiment,” which many of them viewed as the trail-blazer for an inevitable trend in all modern industrial societies. That was nine years ago. Now it seems that the nationalization dogma has lost most of its force even in Labour circles. But another great experiment has been in progress on the Continent, in West Germany: Mitbestimmung, the scheme under which labor participates in the management of private industrial corporations. In part it was born out of British disillusionment with socialism's erstwhile cure-all. Because of its novelty and uniqueness, it is attracting increasing attention from social scientists. But this time, the different disciplines are unevenly represented. Economists, and especially experts in labor relations, have shown the most interest. When they run across a student of politics in pursuit of the same quarry, they often express surprise. And the Germans, who are being visited, interviewed, questioned, polled, and subjected to every conceivable form of social scientific scrutiny, react even more strongly. They are positively puzzled: “You are not a Nationaloekonom? But then surely an Industrie- or Betriebssoziologe, or perhaps a Jurist ….” The political scientist is an animal of which few of them have heard. And fewer still can imagine off-hand why he would want to concern himself with co-determination.

Because the end of the Cold War failed to produce widespread democratic transitions, it is often viewed as having had only a superficial effect on Africa’s authoritarian regimes. We show this sentiment to be incorrect. Focusing on the elite coalitions undergirding autocracies, we argue that the end of the Cold War sparked profound changes in the constellation of alliances within regimes. It was an international event whose ripple effects altered the domestic political landscape and thereby enticed elite coalitions to transform and meet the new existential threat they faced. We demonstrate our argument using cabinets as a proxy for elite coalitions, showing that their composition drastically changed at the end of the Cold War. Africa’s authoritarian leaders dismissed many of the core members of their cabinets and increasingly appointed members of opposition parties to cabinet portfolios. Such changes, we argue, represent the dynamic responses that enabled autocracies to persist.

How does civilian protest shape civil war dynamics? Existing research shows that civilian protests against violence and war contribute to peace and restrain violence against civilians. There is less research on civilian protests that are at odds with peaceful conflict resolution, such as protests to salute armed actors, advocate against peace agreements, and oppose peacekeepers. This study develops a novel typology of wartime civilian protest that brings together protests to different ends, and theorizes the heterogeneous effects of protest on civil war dynamics. Using quantitative and qualitative evidence from new disaggregated and georeferenced event data from Côte d’Ivoire, the study demonstrates that—contingent on certain demands—protests were associated with violence against civilians, violence involving peacekeepers, and failed conflict resolution. These findings contribute new knowledge on how civilians shape the dynamics of civil war, and caution that nonviolent civilian action may not only be a force for de-escalation and peace.

While it is quite true that French political life is characterized by its individualism, a question arises as to the degree of vacillation and cohesiveness evidenced by the various political groupings. With a view to answering this query, an analysis is herein undertaken of the vote behavior in the Chamber of Deputies during the year 1930.

The story of 1930 tells of the uncertain rule and fall of Tardieu and his cabinet. The Chamber with which he dealt had been elected during the period of the Poincaré coalition cabinet, which was supported by Right-Center forces and the Radical Socialists. The Radical Socialists withdrew their support in the fall of 1928, and Poincaré had to remake his cabinet with Right-Center support. In the fall of 1929, ill health forced Poincaré to resign, and, after others failed, Tardieu formed a cabinet with a majority support. Like Poincaré's 1929 cabinet, it was maintained by Right-Center forces.

This paper studies, theoretically and experimentally, a model of electoral competition that allows for platforms where candidates may be ambiguous about which policy they will implement if elected. We argue that uncertainty about the policy preferences of the electorate, combined with perceived similarity of voters and candidates, can lead to the latter running on these ambiguous platforms. By appealing to voters from both ends of the spectrum, such platforms can ensure electoral success for noncentrist candidates in a sufficiently polarized society. Ambiguous platforms pose a threat to democratic representation because winning noncentrists always implement policies in favor of a minority and against the preferences of the majority. In our laboratory experiment, ambiguous platforms are chosen frequently by candidates and gain notable support from voters. Our main treatment variation provides causal evidence that ambiguous platforms are more popular among noncentrist voters if one of the candidates is a known centrist.

How does racial diversity impact institutional outcomes and (in)equality? Discussions about diversity usually focus on how individuals’ identities shape their behavior, but diversity is a group-level characteristic. Scholars must, therefore, consider the relationship between group composition and the individual decisions that shape institutional outcomes. Using felony data from a large U.S. court system, I explore the relationship between racial diversity among the judges comprising a court and individual judges’ decisions. I find that as the percent of Black judges in a courthouse increases white judges are less likely to render incarceration sentences in cases with Black defendants. Increases in racial diversity decrease the Black–white gap in the probability of incarceration by up to 7 percentage points. However, I find no relationship between judge’s racial identities and disparities in their decisions. This study highlights the importance of conceptualizing diversity as a group characteristic and the relationship between institutional context and outcomes.

The affairs of the Teamsters Union have suddenly loomed with an importance seldom recognized in any private association of this highly associated country. No doubt a major source of the recent interest in the internal politics of this and other unions is the fascination exerted by intimations of colorful criminality. Senator McClellan's committee, indeed, has gone far to indulge the widespread taste for this variety of sensation. Some segments of public opinion have obviously been gratified to be given ammunition useful in a campaign to weaken the economic and political power of organized labor. Meanwhile, the prospect for a few elementary reforms has suddenly improved. The American labor movement has acted to cleanse itself of some of the stain which has drawn so much attention. Legislative proposals designed to insure integrity of union elections and financial management are actively agitated.

Nevertheless, publicity and agitation have so far done little to illuminate the basic problem. The public hue and cry about gangsters quite possibly may have hindered rather than helped understanding of what is involved.

The new Italian Constitution was written by the 556 deputies the Italian people elected to their first Constitutional Assembly on June 2, 1946. The Assembly approved the Constitution on December 22, 1947, by a vote of 453 favorable, 62 opposed, and 31 absent. After this approval the Constitution was promulgated by the Provisional President of Italy, Enrico de Nicola, and became effective ten days later, on January 1, 1948. Numerous evaluations of the Constitution are available, and it is not our purpose here to duplicate this work. We are concerned solely with discovering to what extent the Constitution was actually in effect during the four and one-half year period following its promulgation and with explaining, if possible, why there has been so much delay in implementing some of its basic provisions.

What we shall find is that some enabling legislation was passed by the Constitutional Assembly in the interim period between the effective date of the Constitution and the election of the first Parliament in April, 1948. Parliament has implemented a few more constitutional provisions, but vast and basic sections of the Constitution are still ineffective, owing to Parliament's inaction. To a lesser degree the administration and the courts are in a position to implement the Constitution.