On June 11, 2013, in Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica, a chamber of the European Court of Human Rights found that the Dutch courts’ grant of immunity to the United Nations in a case brought by and on behalf of relatives of individuals killed by the Army of the Republika Srpska in and around Srebrenica in July 1995 did not run afoul of Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention). Those provisions guarantee, respectively and among other things, the right of access to a court and the right to “an effective remedy before a national authority” if any Convention right is violated. Having found that the challenged decisions accorded with Dutch obligations under the Convention, the chamber declared the application before the Court inadmissible as “manifestly ill-founded” and “rejected” it pursuant to Article 35(3)(a) and 4. The chamber’s decision was unanimous.

Some sixteen years ago, on the occasion one of many symposia on the possibility of a new Restatement on Conflict of Laws to replace the much-derided Second Restatement, Mathias Reimann suggested that a new Restatement should focus on the requirements of what he called “the international age.” Conflict of laws is increasingly international, he pointed out. This remains true today—just recall that three of the four recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions on personal jurisdiction concerned international conflicts. A new Restatement must take that into account. Reimann formulated three very sensible wishes for drafters of a new Restatement: they should consider every rule and principle they formulate with international disputes in mind; they should work comparatively; and they should include foreign advisers.

States are investing heavily in artificial intelligence (AI) technology, and are actively incorporating AI tools across the full spectrum of their decision-making processes. However, AI tools are currently deployed without a full understanding of their impact on individuals or society, and in the absence of effective domestic or international regulatory frameworks. Although this haste to deploy is understandable given AI's significant potential, it is unsatisfactory. The inappropriate deployment of AI technologies risks litigation, public backlash, and harm to human rights. In turn, this is likely to delay or frustrate beneficial AI deployments. This essay suggests that human rights law offers a solution. It provides an organizing framework that states should draw on to guide their decisions to deploy AI (or not), and can facilitate the clear and transparent justification of those decisions.

As global crises become more frequent, international organizations increasingly invoke emergency powers to address them. But the study of international organization emergency governance remains in its infancy. We consider the EU response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The EU built on the emergency to accelerate EU integration and introduce unprecedented reforms in defense and security, migration and asylum, and energy. We map the techniques the EU deployed to achieve this and argue that they are not as alarming as critics have suggested.

On November 15, 2017, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Court) rendered a historic advisory opinion (Advisory Opinion) on the relationship between human rights and the environment. The opinion was a response to a request from Colombia regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction of state parties to the American Convention, in particular their obligations under the rights to life and personal integrity, arising from the construction and operation of large-scale infrastructure projects in the Greater Caribbean region. Colombia's concern was that, due to their dimensions and permanence, such projects could cause significant environmental harm, that goes beyond national borders, and, as a consequence, adversely affect the inhabitants of the whole region and the enjoyment of their rights under the Convention (para. 2). One of the most important aspects of the Advisory Opinion is the Court's finding that in relation to large-scale transboundary infrastructure projects, state parties to the Convention can exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction under certain circumstances and thus be responsible for the human rights of the people in the affected area. Another significant finding of the Court is that Article 26 of the American Convention, which provides for the progressive realization of economic, social, and cultural rights, includes an autonomous right to a healthy environment—a right fundamental for the existence of humankind. Finally, the Court directly linked the rights to life and personal integrity with general principles of international environmental under a due diligence obligation. The Court's extensive use of international environmental law instruments, case law, and reasoning could pave the way for greater interconnection and integration between human rights and international environment law obligations.

The relationship between human rights and humanitarian law is one of the most contentious topics in the history of international law. Most scholars studying their foundations argue that these two fields of law developed separately until the 1960s. This article, by contrast, reveals a much earlier cross-fertilization between these disciplines. It shows how “human rights thinking” played a critical generative role in transforming humanitarian law, thereby creating important legacies for today's understandings of international law in armed conflict.

After twenty years of frustrated attempts to bring South Africa to accept her international obligations in respect of South West Africa, the United Nations General Assembly resolved on October 27, 1966, to terminate South Africa’s right to administer the Territory. In this resolution the Assembly declared that

Recent press and Congressional discussion regarding the question of French taxation of property in France owned by the United States Government and used for mutual defense purposes suggests the desirability of considering whether international law forbids a state to impose taxes on public property owned by another state.

The American Journal of International Law (AJIL) stands in dialectical tension between its American and its international identities. At its founding, and in periodic reassessments on the occasion of anniversaries or changes of leadership, its editors in chief have offered their understandings of the place for this Journal at the intersection of American and international life. One of our predecessors wrote in the Journal’s sixth decade of “a dual function, both that of laying international law material before American readers, and that of placing American viewpoints on international law before the rest of the world.” Poised at the threshold of a new century, we can take this opportunity for reflection in the image of Janus on both our American (internationalist) origins and our increasingly international (yet in some senses still American) future.

Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago. Award on Jurisdiction and Merits. At <http://www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/>, available at 45 ILM 800 (2006).

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal, April 11, 2006.

The dispute addressed in the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago arbitration emerged during nine rounds of negotiations concerning delimitation of die maritime boundary in the western, central, and eastern sectors of their overlapping claims to the continental shelf and 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Caribbean Sea (five rounds), along with associated questions posed by the continuing access for Barbadian fisherfolk to flying fish stocks south of a prospective equidistance line in the western sector (four rounds). In February 2004, according to Barbados, the prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago declared the issue of the maritime boundary “intractable” (para. 56) and invited Barbados to proceed, if it so wished, with arbitration. Barbados then invoked the compulsory arbitration provisions of Part XV, Section 2, of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention). Upon its establishment, the Annex VII Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Arbitral Tribunal [Tribunal], which comprised President Stephen M. Schwebel and arbitrators Ian Brownlie, Vaughan A. Lowe, Francisco Orrego Vicuña, and Sir Arthur Watts, adopted its Rules of Procedure and issued four orders by year's end. After joining Trinidad and Tobago's preliminary objections to the merits phase, the Tribunal held hearings in London on October 17-28,2005. The vital interests of the two states in valuable oil and fishery resources were reflected in the high intensity of the factual and legal (both procedural and substantive) contentions forcefully disputed by the parties as represented by leading international counsel, and a number of procedurally incidental issues arose in the context of the proceedings’ confidentiality and the treatment of evidence.

The Second World War inflicted countless sufferings and misfortunes on mankind. At the same time the war put to the test, in the sacrifice and heroism at the battlefronts and in the rear, many peoples and states, social forms and political systems, doctrines and theories.

The five issues of Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo which are here reviewed (Nos. 6, 7 and 8 of 1954, and Nos. 1 and 2 of 1955) contain a series of articles devoted to a discussion of the basic notions of international law. This discussion is related to the preparation of a new textbook for Soviet law schools the completion of which this year has been announced by the A. Ya. Vyshinsky Institute of Law, a branch of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

The international law of mobility has by and large been focused on the question of immigration. Its emphasis has therefore been on what I will call, for convenience's sake, the host state. It is there that some of the most intense dilemmas around the question of mobility have arisen in a context of populism, xenophobia, and racism. The state of nationality is not invisible in that context, but this has not typically been the primary variable in trying to understand and assess the normative challenges of global mobility. The COVID-19 pandemic, however, has refocused attention on distinct patterns of mobility, particularly return mobility, of nationals to their country of origin as well as limitations on leaving that country in the first place. The state of nationality has increasingly been asked to mediate demands for security and public health that are extra-territorial and that implicate its nationals in sometimes far-flung locations. I argue that the pandemic is a further opportunity to shift attention onto the state of nationality as a locus of key decisions concerning transnational mobility and thus to rebalance our sense of what goes into the global “mobility equation.”