International coöperation in economic and social fields, a direct consequence of the amazing progress attained in the field of transportation and communications, has progressed during recent decades with remarkable speed. There were leagues and associations of states even in ancient times, and some of them were formed and maintained for economic as well as for political purposes, but modern economic and social cooperation extends to the most varied spheres of human activity and emphasizes more and more the interests of individuals as contrasted with those of states.1 It finds its most characteristic expression in the so-called public international unions, associations of sovereign states for the accomplishment of certain definite tasks in the economic and social field, but it is embodied also in the important work of private international associations. Organizations of the latter type have often been instrumental in bringing about important international regulations.

In the Namibia case, the International Court of Justice for the first time in its history received an application for the appointment of a judge ad hoc in advisory proceedings. The application was made by South Africa on the basis of Article 83 of the Rules of Court which provides for the possibility of seating judges ad hoc in advisory procedings involving “a legal question actually pending between two or more States.” No state or international organization entitled to appear before the Court opposed the South African request, and no state other than South Africa submitted an application for a judge ad hoc. After an oral hearing (held in camera over strong South African protests 8) in which only South Africa presented argument, the Court, in its Order of January 29, 1971, decided, by a vote of 10 to 5, to reject South Africa's application. The Court offered no explanation for its decision at the time. Of the five dissenting judges, only Judges Onyeama and Dillard appended to the Order the reasons for their dissent. The remaining dissenting judges (and, by implication, the Court itself) feared that early disclosure of the reasons for their stands entailed the risk of prejudging substantive questions in the case. (As will be seen below, Judges Onyeama and Dillard had no cause to entertain similar fears.) With the delivery of the opinion, however, all five dissenting judges voiced strong criticism of the Court's refusal to admit a South African judge ad hoc.

On June 30, 1967, in Geneva, Switzerland, Ambassador W. Michael Blumenthal, acting at the direction of the President, signed five multilateral agreements on behalf of the United States. He and the representatives of 45 other countries thereby concluded the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations and formalized an elaborate set of international obligations which, over a period of four years, would see the most extensive liberalization of trade ever achieved through co-operative action on the part of the trading countries of the world.

The number of countries in which domestic courts are actively engaged with major public affairs has increased markedly since the early 1990s. In many transitional states, in particular, domestic courts have ruled on great constitutional controversies, which influence the national political process. They have also taken an active role in the application of international law— especially human rights treaties—and at times treat such treaties as a “New Standard of Civilization.” In particular, domestic courts have at times invoked international law in becoming more aggressive toward the executive branch. This trend has been one normative element inspiring some theorists to propose a new field known as comparative international law. This article highlights a different set of elements that become manifest in assessing the rapid overall rise in references to, and application of, international law by courts in China in recent years.

This contribution considers why states as well as international courts and tribunals should act to remedy the gender imbalance on international benches. In my view, the most appropriate question is not why they must, but why they should. Arguments that states are legally bound under the UN Charter to address this gender imbalance are weak, though human rights law does provide a basis for claims that states must take action. But arguments about legitimacy—both normative and sociological—could provide a more persuasive basis for arguing that states as well as courts and tribunals should act. In particular, the normative legitimacy of international courts and tribunals could benefit from selection procedures designed to help ensure that states nominate the most meritorious candidates for judgeships.

The celebrated scrap of paper incident is perhaps thought so effective a commentary on the “legal nature” of treaties that it needs no addition. “Treaties won’t stand before policy and there’s an end on’t.” The student of history is likely to take a more cautious view. He knows that treaties have been one-sidedly abrogated before. He knows that the ambiguous phrase rebus sic stantibus has generally been an implied accompaniment of treaties, and yet he knows that treaties have continued to be concluded and in general observed.

The Military and Paramilitary Activities case deepens the gloom already surrounding the two forms of the International Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. Neither Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute, which confers general compulsory jurisdiction upon the Court in cases of reciprocal state declarations, nor that part of Article 36(1) which vests jurisdiction when treaties so provide has been particularly successful in recent practice. No one denies that the ICJ has served a useful, if occasional, role when it has heard and decided cases voluntarily submitted by then-willing states pursuant to the specially conferred provision of Article 36(1). What is in question is the utility of the all too many recent cases where the Court has taken jurisdiction pursuant to the compulsory provisions of its Statute and then has been, to one degree or another, disregarded.

The Immigration Act of 1924 is a novel piece of legislation in two respects.1 In it, for the first time, is a real attempt made to control immigration,measurably at least, at its source, and thus to reduce to a minimum the hardships and inhumanities that heretofore have prevailed to such an extent as almost to be regarded as a matter of course. And in it, for the first time also, are immigration and eligibility to citizenship recognized as related subjects, and ineligibility to become naturalized made a reason for the exclusion of aliens.2 While it is by far the most drastic immigration statute ever passed by the United States Congress,, it is in numerous respects the most humane measure yet devised.

On November 7, 1973, Congress overrode the veto of President Richard Nixon and enacted a law intended to “insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of the United States Armed Forces into hostilities.” A war-making process that had too long been political, many legislators euphorically believed, had been made legal.

The practice of extending protection, or “ asylum,” within the walls of legations and consulates to refugees and unfortunates, rests upon no very satisfactory legal basis, but rather upon considerations of humanity. Though from time to time certain recognized doctrines of international law and certain doctrines of somewhat more doubtful recognition have been asserted in justification, it will be found that the so-called “ right of asylum ” is no right at all, but only a privilege granted or claimed where its use seems necessary by reason of an unstable condition of society.

When the World War, in which aircraft was employed for the first time on an extensive scale as an instrument of combat, broke out, there were few conventional rules and naturally little or no customary law in existence governing the conduct of hostilities in the air. There was, to be sure, the declaration prohibiting for a period of five years the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons or by other new methods of a similar nature, signed at The Hague in 1899 and renewed in 1907 for a period extending to the close of the third peace conference. Since the third conference has never been convoked, the declaration may be regarded as still binding onthe states which have ratified it, in a war in which both or all the belligerents are contracting parties. But it is significant that only about half the states represented at the second conference signed the declaration, and among those which did not were Germany, France, Russia, Spain and Italy. It thus happens that the principal military states of Europe are not parties to it and its value therefore is slight. In consequence of the so-called “solidarity” clause it was not binding upon any of the belligerents during the World War, not even upon those which had ratified it.

The commitment of the United States to its treaty obligations has recently been put in question by two persistent histories of treaty violation—the refusal to pay U.S. United Nations dues in full until the contentious and tenuous settlement of early 2001 and the repeated failure to advise alien prisoners of their rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Official advocacy of an antimissile defense system has also raised concern about the United States’ continuing fidelity to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany. Case No. 137/1997.

Court of First Instance of Leivadia, Greece, October 30, 1997.

On November 27, 1995, the Prefecture of Voiotia (soudiern Greece) and other claimants, in their individual capacity, brought a claim of indemnity before the Court of First Instance of Leivadia against the German state. The plaintiffs based their claims on atrocities (willful murder and destruction of private property) committed by German occupation forces against the persons and property of die village of Distomo in Voiotia on June 10, 1944. They sought compensation for the material and mental damage suffered as a result of those atrocities, which were specifically described in their briefs. The Greek Foreign Office forwarded the complaint to the German Foreign Office, which rejected and returned it to the Greek Embassy on the grounds that the suit impaired the sovereign rights of the German state. Germany was not represented at trial. The court awarded damages to the individual claimants of 9,448,105,000 drachmas (approximately $30 million).