A rule of customary international law of recent origin has conferred sovereign rights over the continental shelf to individual states for the limited purposes of exploration and exploitation. The attribution of such exclusive jurisdiction required the delimitation of boundaries between the submarine areas appertaining to various littoral states. The importance of such partition of the seabed and subsoil is self-evident, but two points do call for comment. First, since the shelf may be considerably extended in the future according to the criterion of exploitability, the method now adopted will have a constantly growing significance. Second, the acquisition of the sea bottom by coastal nations has created inequalities between them, depending on their relative degree of technical development as well as on their geographical circumstances. The drawing of boundaries separating their respective shelves can aggravate or diminish these inequalities.

The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) was established in 1922. Article 36, paragraph 2 of its Statute reads:

1. (a) the interpretation of a treaty;

2. (b) any question of international law;

3. (c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;

4. (d) the nature and extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.

This Current Development Essay discusses the international legal implications of constitutional amendments adopted in the Russian Federation by an “all-Russian vote,” a quasi-referendum from June 25 to July 1, 2020. The most important of these amendments gives the Russian Constitution priority over decisions made by international courts and treaty bodies. The amendments also address Russia's state succession to the Soviet Union. Another provision protects Russia's territorial integrity. The Essay discusses the background to these amendments, their content, and their significance for international law.

Just previous to the outbreak of the European War there was an international conference in session at Christiania in Norway which was charged with the solution of. a problem unique from an international standpoint. It arose from the extraordinary political situation of the archipelago of Spitzbergen lying about four hundred miles north of the Norwegian coast.

In October 1988 the American Branch of the International Law Association and the American Society of International Law established a Joint Committee on the Role of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State. The Committee’s charge was to examine the role of the Legal Adviser in encouraging respect for international law in the U.S. government decisionmaking process, and to make suggestions and recommendations to enhance the Legal Adviser’s effectiveness in this regard. The thirty-four members of the Committee included nine former Legal Advisers, a former President’s counsel, other past and present U.S. government officials, academics and private attorneys. Collectively, the Committee reflected broad experience and a variety of perspectives as regards issues of U.S. foreign policy and international law. (The members of the Committee are listed in footnote 1.)

The phenomenon to which the expression “flags of convenience” is applied dates back to the end of the First World War when certain nontraditional maritime countries, especially Panama, Liberia, and Honduras, started to register foreign-owned vessels under their flags for economic reasons and exercised minimal control over the activities and operations of these vessels. This practice aroused considerable controversy and opposition. The seafarers’ unions were concerned about the low standards alleged to prevail on these vessels and about the loss of job opportunities for seamen from traditional maritime countries. The shipowners from certain European countries, supported by their governments, saw the practice as one that generated serious competition against them, especially because of the virtual tax-free concessions accorded to the owners of flags of convenience vessels.

There are some who say that adjudication has no role to play in the settlement of disputes over the uses of waters of international rivers. One author writes:

Most comprehensively viewed, the international law of the sea comprises two very different sets of principles. One set of principles, establishing certain basic, overriding community goals, prescribes for all states the widest possible access to, and the fullest enjoyment of, the shared use of the great common resource of the oceans. The other set of principles, commonly described as jurisdictional, expresses certain implementing policies designed economically to secure the basic community goals of shared use by establishing a shared competence among states in a domain largely free from the exclusive public order of any particular state.

When the late Sir Hersch Lauterpacht became a member of the International Court of Justice in February, 1955 (a position he was to fill effectively for barely five years, until the fall of 1959), he went to The Hague with some thirty years of devoted study and practice of international law behind him. As teacher and student of international law, as a most highly qualified publicist (in the words of Article 38(1) (d) of the Statute of the Court) of recognized universal authority, he had devoted himself both to the law in general and in particular to the problems of the judicial settlement of international disputes, whether by the Permanent Court of International Justice and its present-day successor, the International Court of Justice, or by ad hoc arbitration tribunals. Indeed, his writings as a whole display a rare preoccupation with the entire philosophy and the practical problems of the judicial settlement of international disputes, together with a deep understanding of its limitations and a satisfying freedom both from putting forward extravagant claims in its behalf and from purely theoretical speculations.

International water law (IWL) principles are often called upon to address disagreements and conflict between riparian states to a shared watercourse, with various parties invoking them to guide states’ behavior towards cooperative solutions that benefit the water resources as well as broader regional cooperation and peace. This essay argues that it is particularly important to acknowledge the role IWL principles play in negotiation processes, that is, in an ex ante and non-judicial function, providing a framework for cooperation and contributing to lawmaking, which makes them important tools of international relations and water diplomacy. First, IWL principles are particularly relevant in negotiation processes. IWL principles are thus not only relevant to legal adjudication or enforcement, but are also tools of international relations and diplomacy. Additionally, in their ex ante role, in the context of negotiations or other non-judicial interactions between riparian states, IWL principles can pose an inherent dilemma, as they can both provide a framework for negotiations and be the focus of negotiations, each dimension having implications for the effectiveness of negotiations and the likelihood of negotiated compromise outcomes. Third, in spite of this inherent dilemma and its possible negative repercussions on negotiation outcomes, the use of IWL principles in negotiations has a lawmaking function, contributing to the further development and strengthening of the overall legal regime for governing shared watercourses.

Foreign affairs, and its close relation national security, has been a graveyard for civil liberties for much of our recent history. The questions to be answered are not whether this is true—it demonstrably is—but why we have come to this pass and how we might begin to relieve the Bill of Rights of at least some of the burden thus imposed on it.

Three decisions on maritime boundaries in a period of 9 months during 1984-1985 have doubled the body of case law on the delimitation of ocean space. The cases decided by international tribunals prior to 1984 applied only to the continental shelf. The waters overlying the shelf were either part of the high seas or, if subject to coastal state jurisdiction, were left undivided as between neighboring coastal states. However, two of the decisions rendered last year—the decision by a Chamber of the International Court of Justice in the Gulf of Maine case and the one by an ad hoc arbitral tribunal in the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case—constituted the first judicial determinations of boundaries that divide jurisdiction over both the continental shelf and the water column beyond the territorial sea. The decision by the International Court of Justice in the Libya/Malta Continental Shelf case represented the fourth in a line of cases delimiting the continental shelf alone.

The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, otherwise known as the Helms-Burton Act, became law on March 12, 1996. Title III of the legislation creates a federal cause of action, on behalf of U.S. citizens whose property was confiscated without compensation by Cuba, against those who “traffic” in that property. Several governments—notably Canada, Mexico and those of the European Union, whose corporate citizens are the principal “traffickers”—have denounced the legislation as an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction that violates customary international law. These governments apparently see nothing wrong with permitting—even encouraging—their nationals to use and profit from property that rightfully belongs to others. The United States not only commands the moral high ground on this issue; it also has the better of the legal argument.

At Bayonne, on Tuesday before the Feast of St. Barnabas the Apostle, in the year 1295, John, lieutenant in Gascony of the King of England, signed a letter addressed to all the officers of the King. At Canterbury, on October 3 of the same year, John's uncle, Edward I, King of England and Duke of Acquitaine, put his seal on a document addressed to his officers, in which he included John's letter in full and ratified its provisions subject to two briefly-stated conditions.