A careful examination of the nature of international relations and the specific technique of international law shows a basic difficulty confronting every attempt to regulate relations between States. It is the fact that in case of disputes between States there exists no authority accepted generally and obligatorily as competent to settle international conflicts, that is, to answer impartially the question: which of the parties to the conflict is right and which is wrong. If the States do not reach an agreement, or do not voluntarily submit their dispute to arbitration, each State is left to decide for itself the question whether the other State has violated, or is about to violate, its right; and the State which considers itself injured is free to enforce the law, and that means what it considers to be the law, by resorting to war or reprisals against the alleged wrongdoer. Since the other State has the same competence to decide for itself the question of law, the fundamental legal problem remains without impartial solution. The objective examination and unbiased decision of the question whether or not the law has been violated is the most important and essential stage in any legal procedure. As long as it is not possible to remove from the States in dispute the prerogative to answer for themselves this question of law and transfer it once and for all to an impartial authority, namely, an international court, further progress toward the reign of law and order in the world will be slow indeed.

On August 1, 1975 the Chiefs of State and other high representatives of 33 European countries, the United States, and Canada signed the Final Act of The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki. This event, described as the largest meeting of European leaders since the Congress of Vienna or by the more enthusiastic as the largest such meeting in history, had been little discussed in the North American press and caught the American public largely unprepared. Logic dictated that such an impressive gathering had to have an equally impressive purpose, and editorial writers struggled to explain the significance of the occasion. The general conclusion was that the President had demeaned himself by recognizing Soviet postwar hegemony in Eastern Europe without any substantial quid pro quo. George Ball called it “a defeat for the West.” Much of this comment in the media was without benefit of the complex document actually signed at Helsinki, covering sixty printed pages, which was made available to the public only one week prior to the signing. The Department of State, concerned that euphoria over this event might lead to increased pressure for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe and for other forms of unilateral disarmament, played down the Conference as an exercsie which was primarily of interest to the allies of the United States and which in any case had not produced documents of a legally binding character. For those determined to oppose the Conference, this appeared to be some form of coverup, whereas to those who saw merit in the texts, this seemed to depreciate the usefulness of some important steps in the right direction. Confusion over a document as carefully drawn, as vague and full of interrelationships and loopholes as is the Final Act is natural, and the results of the Conference should provide many a scholar a rich harvest of material for study for years to come.

Should the Persian Gulf war of 1990-1991 be characterized as an “international enforcement action” of the United Nations Security Council or as a campaign of collective self-defense approved, encouraged, and blessed by the Security Council?

This is not simply a nice and rather metaphysical legal issue, but an extremely practical one. The question it presents is whether the control and direction of hostilities in the gulf, their termination, and the substance of the settlement they produce were handled by the Council as the Korean War was handled, that is, as a campaign of collective self-defense, or as the United Nations’ first “international enforcement action.” According to some international lawyers, characterizing the gulf war as a Security Council “enforcement action” under the untried procedures of Articles 42-50 of the Charter would in effect eviscerate Article 51, make the exercise of each state’s “inherent” right of self-defense subject to the permission of the Security Council, threaten the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council, and thus lead to extremely grave and perhaps insoluble political difficulty. It could even destroy the United Nations.

It began as a very small dispute. Pan American World Airways planned to introduce a service from San Francisco to Paris with a stop in London, using a Boeing 747 aircraft from San Francisco to London and a smaller Boeing 727 aircraft from London to Paris. The change to a smaller plane would have enabled the most efficient and economic use of Pan Am’s fleet. In aviation as in railroad terminology, a change along a route to equipment of a different size is called a “change of gauge.”

Marine pollution is a global problem in several senses. It affects the health of the oceans in all parts of the world; it affects all countries, both developed and developing; and all countries contribute to some aspects of the problem. Some marine pollution problems are local, but many have international implications. Particularly if the effects of pollution on the living resources of the sea are considered, very few marine pollution problems can be considered matters of exclusively local interest.

One of the most striking features of the present Spanish civil war has been the evolution, and devolution, of the international accord for non-intervention in Spain, and the observation and patrol system set up in connection therewith. The purpose motivating the accord was the desire to prevent Europe from becoming so bound up with and so divided over the ideological aspects of the conflict that the fighting would lead to a general European war. If the devices have not succeeded altogether in stopping the entrance of supplies and men into Spain; if they have glossed over or provided a screen behind which violations of pledged undertakings have occurred; if they have become popular laughing-stock, and have allowed unfortunate Spain to become a military laboratory for the testing of weapons and strategy, they have, nevertheless, been instrumental, along with other things perhaps, in averting for at least the first year of the Spanish war an extension of hostilities to other territories. Care need well be exercised lest the entire scheme be dropped, for Spanish civil wars have always been long drawn-out affairs lasting several years, and it should not be supposed that the general crisis is over, or that the mere granting of belligerent rights to the contestants will diminish the dangers.

The right of self-determination has long been celebrated for bringing independence and self-government to oppressed groups, yet it remains a highly controversial norm of international law. From the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires after World WarI to the struggle of colonial territories for independence following World War II and the later dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, there has been an unavoidable conflict between the efforts of peoples to achieve independence and the demands of existing states to preserve their territorial integrity.

In November 2000, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC or Convention) and its three protocols on human trafficking, migrant smuggling, and firearms. These instruments are the product of three years of diplomatic negotiations, and they represent a substantial contribution to international lawmaking in the area of transnational criminal law. UNTOC has attracted almost universal participation, with 190 states parties at present. Nearly two decades after the adoption of these instruments, however, remarkably little is known about whether states parties have implemented UNTOC and its protocols in their national legislation, whether they enforce such legislation, and whether they make use of UNTOC's provisions concerning international cooperation (e.g., extradition and mutual legal assistance). In other words, the influence of these instruments in practice remains largely unknown.

This Article analyzes the rise of international transformative constitutionalism in Latin America and responds to some of the challenges to its legitimacy and effectiveness. It focuses on the practice of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), the decisions and procedures of which constitute a small, but vibrant and essential, part of a wider Latin American community of human rights—a diverse group of actors who confront violence, social exclusion, and weak institutions through legal means.

International law is both a contemplative academic subject and an active ingredient of diplomatic process in world affairs. The failure to maintain the clarity of this distinction accounts for considerable confusion about the nature and function of international law in the world today. An international lawyer is also a citizen of a nation-state who often holds strong views as to preferred courses of foreign policy. One way for him to vindicate these views is to demonstrate their compatibility or incompatibility with governing rules of international law. Confusion arises in scholarly settings whenever the adversary presentation of views is not distinguished from the scholarly assessment of opposing lines of adversary presentation.

Tibet for most people remains a land of mystery. Books continue to be published which deal with its strange cults and religious practices. It is also a land of romance and adventure. But very little has been written on its political history and still less on its legal status. That is why Professor Charles Henry Alexandrowicz-Alexander’s article in the April, 1954, issue of this JOURNAL must be regarded as a welcome contribution.

The popularity of arbitration as a mechanism for settling disputes between transnational contracting parties has led to standardization in many areas of arbitration law and procedure. One important aspect of the arbitral process, however, the practice of awarding compensatory interest, has been left behind in the march toward uniformity. To date, arbitral tribunals have failed to adopt a rational and uniform approach for evaluating interest claims. Consequently, resolving interest claims is often an expensive and time-consuming process, fraught with uncertainty, which typically results in inconsistent arbitral awards. This result is particularly problematic in the international arbitral arena: such claims often involve millions of dollars, and because a lengthy period may elapse between the origin of the dispute and the final award, whether an arbitrator awards interest may be as significant, from a monetary standpoint, as the principal claim itself.

“The trial which is now about to begin is unique in the history of the jurisprudence of the world and it is of supreme importance to millions of people all over the globe.”

Regional human rights courts in Europe and the Americas came into being in the wake of World War II. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) were established in order to adjudicate on alleged violations of the rights of individuals. Yet, since their inception these courts have also influenced other areas of international law. A part from their impact on general international law, their case law has had significant spill over effects on international criminal law, international refugee law, international environmental law, the law of armed conflicts, and the law of the sea.

On the night of December 28, 1968, eight Israeli helicopters took part in an attack on the Beirut International Airport. Israeli commandos descended from six of the helicopters (the other two hovered above) that had landed either on runways or at the hangars of the airport. All commercial aircraft belonging to Arab airlines were destroyed by explosives being placed in the nose-wheel well and in the undercarriage well of each plane. The attack resulted in the destruction of 13 planes whose worth has been estimated to be $43.8 million. Additional damage has been reported done to hangars and other airport installations. Lebanese sources report that two Israeli commandos were injured by gunfire from airport guards. There was no loss of life.