It has been said of the redemptive quality of procedural reform that it is “about nine parts myth and one part coconut oil.” Yet, as the recent history of the United Nations shows, failure to enact adequate procedural reform can have damaging consequences for an organization and its activities. In the targeted-sanctions context, litigation in over thirty national and regional courts over due process deficiencies has had a “significant impact on the regime,” placing it “at a legal crossroads.” In the peacekeeping context, the United Nations’ position that claims in the ongoing Haiti cholera controversy are “not receivable” has been described in extensive and uniformly critical press coverage as the United Nations’ “Watergate, except with far fewer consequences for the people responsible.” Complacency in the face of allegations of sexual abuse by UN blue helmets led to the unprecedented ousting of a special representative to the secretary-general in the Central African Republic. Economizing on due process standards is proving to be a false economy.

Enthusiasm abounds about the potential of artificial intelligence to automate public decision-making. The rise of machine learning and computational text analysis together with the proliferation of digital platforms has raised the prospect of “robo-judging” and “robo-administrators.” From a human rights perspective, the reaction has been mixed, and on balance negative. Optimists herald the possibilities of democratizing legal services and making decision-making more predictable and efficient. Critics warn, however, of the specter of new forms of social control, arbitrariness, and inequality. This essay examines the concerns over the turn to automation from the perspective of two international human rights: the rights to social security and a fair trial. It argues that while the critiques deserve a full hearing, they should be evidence-based, informed by an understanding of “technological systems,” and cognizant of the trade-offs between human and machine failure.

No problem which confronted the Lausanne Conference contributed more to its difficulties than that of “ the capitulations.” For almost four hundred years foreigners have enjoyed extraterritorial rights in the Ottoman Empire—rights which are anomalous when regarded in the light of the recognized principles of international law. Extraordinary privileges and immunities have become so embodied in successive treaties between the great Christian Powers and the Sublime Porte that for most intents and purposes many nationalities in Turkey form a state within a state. This regime has come to be known as “ the capitulations”: a code of legal reconciliation founded upon the immiscibility of Christianity and Islam; and a term of art alone descriptive of extraterritoriality in Turkey.

In June 2002, the Israeli cabinet approved a plan to construct a continuous “security fence” separating much of the occupied West Bank of the Jordan River from Israel proper. The stated purpose of the barrier was to prevent Palestinian terrorists from entering Israel and killing Israeli civilians. Construction began in 2002, and a significant portion of the structure had been completed by early 2004. The current route of the wall deviates significantly from the “Green Line”—the 1949 armistice line that separates the West Bank from Israel. The fence frequently enters and traverses the West Bank, encircling Jewish settlements there. Eventually, about 15 percent of the territory of the West Bank, home to several hundred thousand Palestinians, will lie between the wall and the Green Line.

On December 2, 2004, the UN General Assembly adopted the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property. Capping more than a quarter of a century of intense international negotiation, the new treaty is the first modern multilateral instrument to articulate a comprehensive approach to issues of state or sovereign immunity from suits in foreign courts. Notably, it embraces the so-called restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, under which governments are subject to essentially the same jurisdictional rules as private entities in respect of their commercial transactions. The treaty was opened for signature on January 17, 2005 (when Austria and Morocco became the first states to sign), and will enter into force when thirty states have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession with the UN secretary-general.

In this Essay, we analyze two sets of international legal responses to the COVID-19 pandemic: the academic discussion on state responsibility; and the deployment of international law as a tool for resistance. We argue that both approaches made significant contributions but concealed the role of the discipline in the production of the conditions that led to the pandemic and its unequal impact. These interventions reflect a “modest international law”; an understanding of the discipline that hinders change and is ethically weak. We contend that repoliticization can help reclaim international law's ambition and responsibility.

Kenya became a primary destination for the prosecution of pirates captured off the coast of Somalia from late 2008 to late 2009. Yet none of the pirates being tried in Kenya as of April 2010 were captured by Kenyan armed forces but, rather, by non-Kenyan forces whose countries had signed agreements with Kenya for it to conduct such trials. In Resolution 1851 of December 16, 2008, the United Nations Security Council had urged states and regional organizations to enter into such agreements. Kenya accordingly concluded agreements on prosecuting suspected pirates with the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union, and Denmark. According to media reports, and as Kenya recently acknowledged, two others were negotiated, with China and Canada. Only the EU-Kenya agreement has been published. The British foreign secretary told the House of Commons that Kenya did not want its agreement with the United Kingdom to be made public. Consequently, it may well be that a Kenyan preference for secrecy prevented the public release of information on the other agreements signed by Kenya.

The somewhat surprising majority view in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) assessing Kosovo's declaration of independence has some bearingon prospects for an eventual end to the bitter conflict between Kosovo and Serbia. It may also have some relevance for a variety of political movements around the world whose leaders might be more inclined than previously to tempt fate by declaring their people and territory to be internationally independent of the sovereign state within which they are now geographically located. Significantly,the ICJ majority sidestepped the question put to it by the General Assembly, in a move objectionable to the four dissenting judges,recasting it in such a way as to limit its response to whether Kosovo's declaration of independence, issued on February 17,2008, was “in accordance with international law” to the rather bland assertion that the declaration did not violate international law. The Court did not say, and explicitly ruled out any interpretation suggesting, that Kosovo's declaration was acceptable under international law, although by Lotus reasoning, what a state is not expressly prohibited from doing is permitted.3 The majority also expressed its view that the declaration was not to be viewed as decidingupon Kosovo's final status in world diplomacy.

International lawyers should help our political leaders, die media, and the electorate appreciate more adequately the implications for international law and order of the United States-led invasion of Iraq and its nearest precedent, the Kosovo intervention. At this point, mid-2003, those implications remain unclear.

On August 10, 1976, Greece addressed a communication to the President of the Security Council requesting an urgent meeting of the Council on the ground that “following recent repeated flagrant violations by Turkey of the sovereign rights of Greece in the continental shelf in the Aegean, a dangerous situation has been created threatening international peace and security.” On the same day, by unilateral application, Greece instituted proceedings in the International Court of Justice against Turkey in “a dispute concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf appertaining to Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea, and concerning the respective legal rights of those States to explore and exploit the continental shelf of the Aegean.” Also on the same day Greece filed a request for interim measures of protection asking the Court to direct that both Greece and Turkey

Growing awareness of the economic exploitation of millions of children around the world has catapulted the issue of child labor into the public eye and brought it to the forefront of debate within governments, international organizations and the business sector. Arousing diverse interests, the debate juxtaposes the multilateral trade regime with international law governing labor standards and human rights. Each of the charters establishing the primary international organizations for cooperation in those areas is premised on the interdependence of economic and social progress. Nonetheless, the legal norms governing the various regimes differ in their scope and application to child labor, and formal linkages do not exist between the multilateral trade regime and international supervisory bodies dealing with labor standards and human rights.

Since President Truman claimed zones of extended coastal jurisdiction for the United States in September 1945, the delimitation of zones of national jurisdiction between states with opposite or adjacent coasts has become a major legal and political issue in international relations. The development of the concept of the continental shelf during the 1950s and 1960s, as well as the claim to extended fisheries zones or exclusive economic zones by nearly all coastal states under the sway of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea since the mid-1970s, gave rise to delimitation problems all over the world. Similar problems may arise if more states extend their territorial seas to 12 nautical miles, which they may do under the new United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) of 1982. By now, a considerable number of delimitation agreements have been concluded on the continental shelf and/or the territorial sea, and even agreements on the delimitation of fisheries zones have been reported.

Eighty years ago, in 1935, a major step was taken in international law; the Harvard Research Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime (“Harvard Draft”) was published in the American Journal of International Law. The influence of the Harvard Draft has been nothing but phenomenal and must surely have exceeded the drafters’ wildest ambitions. Indeed, it is fair to say that the structure put forward in the Harvard Draft has represented public international law’s approach to jurisdiction ever since.

One of the most difficult areas for maritime boundary delimitation is the seas adjacent to Central East Asia. This area, which encompasses the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the Yellow Sea, is surrounded by the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan (the Republic of China), Japan, North and South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Russia. Only a few of the maritime boundaries in the area have been settled, leaving most open to dispute. (See map 1, p. 726.) Efforts to settle the unresolved boundaries have not moved forward. Much has been written about the boundary disputes in this area, and efforts to resolve them have explored means other than delimitation.