The confusion engendered by lack of clarity in fundamental conceptions such as “war,” “peace,” and “law” begins with, and is perhaps most clearly exhibited in, the traditional discussion of the many and disparate problems frequently subsumed under headings like “The Initiation of War,” “The Commencement of War,” “The Legal Meaning of War” and “State and Effects of War,” or under the simple query “When does war exist (or begin)?”

On March 30, 1960, the United States and Eumania settled by agreement certain claims of American nationals against Rumania. The agreement provides for the payment by Rumania of a lump sum in discharge of those claims.

In recent years the device of the en bloc or lump-sum settlement of international claims has to some extent replaced the use of the mixed claims commission. Lump-sum settlements between nations are not unique to the 20th century, however, and as early as 1802, the United States paid Great Britain a lump sum of £600,000 ($2,664,000) to settle certain debt claims. In the 19th century also, the United States obtained lump-sum settlements from Prance, Spain, Great Britain, Denmark, Peru, Belgium, Mexico, Brazil and China. Early in the present century mixed claims commissions were used in deciding claims between the United States and Great Britain, war damage claims against Germany, Austria and Hungary, claims between the United States and Mexico, and claims between Panama and the United States. When the work of the United States-Mexican General Claims Commission remained uncompleted after two successive conventions which extended the existence of the Commission, and when practical difficulties beset the United States-Mexican Special Claims Commission, an en-bloc settlement of all claims was the only solution. That settlement signaled disillusionment with mixed claims commissions. Thereafter, the major international claims settlements involving the United States were on a lump-sum basis. The very next settlement was one concluded on October 25, 1934, with Turkey. It provided for the payment of a lump sum of $1,300,000 to settle certain outstanding claims of American citizens against Turkey.

Defendant Fawaz Yunis, a Lebanese resident and citizen, was charged for his alleged involvement in the 1985 hijacking of a Jordanian civil aircraft in the Middle East. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that, under general principles of international law, the court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction over a crime committed by a nonresident alien on foreign soil and that federal law provided no independent basis for such jurisdiction. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia (per Parker, J.) denied the motion to dismiss in part and granted it in part, and held: (1) that those counts of the indictment charging the defendant with violation of section 32(a) of the Destruction of Aircraft Act (18 U.S.C. §32(a) (1986)) (Aircraft Piracy Act) should be dismissed on the ground that this section provided no jurisdiction over aircraft piracy offenses having no connection to U.S. territory; (2) that traditional principles of international law provided sufficient grounds for asserting both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the other crimes charged; and (3) that the Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage Taking (18 U.S.C. §1203 (1986)) (Hostage Taking Act) and section 32(b) of the Aircraft Piracy Act imposed liability for the offenses allegedly committed by the defendant.

On July 28, 1986, the Republic of Nicaragua filed an application instituting proceedings against the Republic of Honduras in the International Court of Justice. Nicaragua alleged that Honduras had allowed armed bands, known as contras, to operate from its territory to the detriment of Nicaraguan sovereignty, that Honduran military forces had directly participated in attacks on Nicaragua and that the Government of Honduras had given material aid and logistical support to the rebels. Nicaragua requested that the Court declare the acts and omissions of Honduras to be violations of international law and order it to desist from all such activities and to make reparations to Nicaragua. Honduras objected to the jurisdiction of the Court and to the admissibility of the Application. The parties subsequently agreed that the Court should first decide these questions before proceeding to the merits. Relying on the Pact of Bogotá for its jurisdictional rationale, the Court unanimously held: that it had jurisdiction and that the Application could be entertained.