Whether or not we agree with the statement that international law is nothing but “international public morality” or, what amounts to the same thing, that international law is “primitive law” as compared with its municipal counterpart, we are more likely to agree on the question that Soviet doctrinal international law1 is nothing but a mirror reflection of official Soviet governmental and party policies. It is essentially a “fighting international law” 2 which has often proved a valuable weapon in the armory of Soviet foreign policy-makers. The zig-zag development of the Soviet doctrinal approach to the question of international personality in general, and in particular to the international legal status of international organizations, vividly demonstrates this fact. We propose to examine in greater detail just one aspect of the Soviet doctrine of international law—the concept of secondary subjects of international law.

On August 21, 2012, the Mexican Supreme Court declared unconstitutional Article 57 of the Mexican Code of Military Justice (CMJ) and in doing so complied with several judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (I/A Court). From the point of view of Mexican law, the Supreme Court’s decision means that civilians who have suffered from the unconstitutional expansion of military jurisdiction in Mexico are, for the first time, protected by the federal judiciary. More significant from the perspective of international law, the decision to bring Mexican law into compliance with the judgments of the I/A Court reflects growing acceptance of that Court’s judgments, and international human rights law, by the states parties to the American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention), as well as the general decline of military jurisdiction and impunity in the region.

In his address to the First Peace Conference on May 20, 1899, President De Staal remarked:

The name “ Peace Conference,” which the instinct of the peoples, outstripping in this respect the decision taken by the governments, has given to our reunion, well indicates the essential object of our labors. The “ Peace Conference ” cannot fail in the mission incumbent upon it. It must produce from its deliberations a tangible result which the whole of humanity awaits with confidence.

Such was the keynote of the salutation with which doubt and pessimism were greeted upon their arrival at The Hague in 1899. Certainly, in 1907 the nations, after the impressive lessons taught by two terrible wars, whether anxious participants or silent witnesses, have a still more ardent desire for permanent peace, and the duty owed by the governments to humanity is not less solemn or less evident.