On September 2, 2020, the Trump administration announced that the United States had added the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, and the head of the Office of the Prosecutor's Jurisdiction, Complementarity, and Cooperation Division, Phakiso Mochochoko, to the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons. The action followed Executive Order 13,928, signed in June, which authorized economic sanctions and visa restrictions on ICC employees who are investigating whether U.S. forces committed war crimes in Afghanistan. Governments and human rights groups decried the sanctions as an attack on international justice.

On November 25, 2015, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Court) held that the state of Suriname had violated the rights of two indigenous groups by denying recognition of their juridical personality and their entitlement to collective property and judicial protection. In Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname, the Court also considered the impact of nature reserves on indigenous land rights, as well as the legitimacy of private titling of property that encroaches on land for which collective title has not been attained. The decision pushes the Court's previous jurisprudence significantly—and somewhat controversially—by asserting that under the American Convention on Human Rights, indigenous peoples are entitled, as collective entities, to recognition of their legal personality. In so doing, the Court challenged ordinary assumptions about the individualized character of most adjudication regarding international human rights and made the possibility of enforcing collective rights more palpable.

International law on the rights of Indigenous peoples has developed rapidly in recent decades. In the latest phase of this development, international instruments on the rights of Indigenous peoples have increasingly offered universalized statements. However, the reality remains that the implementation of Indigenous rights must take place in particular circumstances in particular states. The form of domestic implementation of Indigenous rights may or may not connect closely to international law statements on these rights, and there may be good reasons for that. This essay takes up a particular example of Indigenous land rights and a significant recent development on land rights in the Supreme Court of Canada.

As a result of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., claims brought under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) must “touch and concern the territory of the United States … with sufficient force” for federal courts to recognize a federal common law cause of action for violations of international law.

As Kristina Daugirdas points out in her article on the role of reputation in international organizations (IOs), peacekeeping operations include a multitude of actors with varying interests. These actors have competing priorities, which forces IOs to balance the needs of the actors involved in peacekeeping missions. Because IOs often depend on member states as implementing agents, this could cause IOs to suppress their own interests in favor of member states, which could ultimately negatively affect the communities in which the peacekeepers operate. This dynamic is present in UN peacekeeping operations. While Daugirdas seeks to align the incentives of the UN and the states that contribute peacekeepers so as to harness reputation as a force to encourage the good behavior of all involved, I argue that this alignment rarely happens because of IOs’ reliance on member states. Through the dynamics of UN peacekeeping operations, I show that the UN reliance on states to provide police officers and troops suppresses the UN's own interests in favor of the contributing states’ interests. I also identify a carrots and sticks approach to balancing incentives. As Paul Stephan does in his essay for this symposium, I draw on a rational-choice, actor-based theory to identify the mixed motives of the various actors who staff and operate peacekeeping missions. The framework proposed here, I contend, provides a way to better understand the sources of the tension that exist when evaluating reputation as a disciplinary tool for IOs.

As part of the “America First” agenda discussed in his inaugural address, President Donald J. Trump promised that “[e]very decision” on trade, among other areas, would be “made to benefit American workers and American families.” During its first months, the Trump Administration made a number of trade moves apparently in connection with this “America First” trade agenda, including initiating national security investigations into steel and aluminum imports under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and preparing an “omnibus” report on trade deficits. The Trump Administration also took steps to alter U.S. treaty relationships, by withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, announcing the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement, and requesting a special session of a joint committee created under the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement. In August 2017, President Trump continued this course—and indicated a willingness to take unilateral action against U.S. trading partners—by signing a presidential memorandum directing the United States Trade Representative to determine whether China's treatment of U.S. intellectual property warranted investigation under Section 301 et seq. of the Trade Act of 1974.

Joseph R. Biden was elected President of the United States during a period of compound crises for global health and security: the worst pandemic in a century, as well as steep reverses in progress toward reducing poverty, hunger, and disease. The United States has been in full retreat from global health leadership, fraying relationships with allies, weakening global institutions, and engaging in nationalist populism that threatens global cooperation to address worldwide challenges. Yet these tragic circumstances are also fertile soil for deep structural reforms. President Biden can both bolster the immediate responses to COVID-19 and its vast ramifications, and spearhead lasting changes to create a healthier and safer world, from which the United States would richly benefit. His immediate task will be to bring U.S. economic and scientific strength to the COVID-19 response in partnership with the World Health Organization (WHO). The Biden administration should also assume financial and strategic leadership in bolstering world efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including its singular pledge to leave no one behind. Finally, President Biden should empower the WHO and lead on reforms to the global health architecture to advance the right to health.

A primary goal of the International Law Commission’s work on the identification of customary international law is to offer “guidance to those called upon to identify the existence of a rule of customary international law,” particularly national court judges. The ILC report, however, should be no less useful to participants in international adjudication. The report’s impact might be particularly significant in investment arbitration, which, given the field’s growing importance and impact, could greatly facilitate the ILC’s principal mandate of promoting the “progressive development of international law.”

Investment arbitration is proving hugely significant for the development of international law. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development reported that, at the end of last year, there were 568 known cases brought under international investment agreements, including 57 cases brought in 2013 alone. There have been 98 different State respondents, including the United States, which reportedly is the ninth most frequent respondent State.

This symposium provides a critical opportunity for international legal scholars to engage with the value and power of certain aspects of culture. The successive holders of the UN mandate on cultural rights have declined to define culture, instead taking a holistic, inclusive approach to its meanings, including inter alia diverse forms of artistic and cultural expressions, languages, worldviews, practices, and cultural heritage. Cultural rights—including the right to take part in cultural life without discrimination, the right to access and enjoy cultural heritage, and freedom of artistic expression—are a core part of the universal human rights framework. They are vital in and of themselves and protect key aspects of the human experience, but they have also been increasingly recognized as important elements of accessing justice and responding to atrocities and as “fundamental to creating and maintaining peaceful and just societies and to promoting enjoyment of other universal human rights.” The artistic and cultural expressions which result from the exercise of these rights likewise have inherent value and can also play significant roles in achieving basic goals of international law and human rights. As I noted in a report to the UN Human Rights Council in my capacity as UN Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights:

Nothing can be said in favor of intimate sexual violence, including marital rape, as Randall and Venkatesh, the authors of Intimate Sexual Violence, Human Rights Obligations and the State, make plain. As the New York Court of Appeals held in 1984:

There is something to be said, however, in favor of clearly setting out a legal position before condemning it, in favor of a conservative approach to the wholesale expansion of human rights, and in favor of enabling women, even women in states that do not criminalize marital rape, to set their own priorities. The authors draw on international law to make a passionate case against marital rape, and against domestic laws that fail to recognize it as a crime. Their argument would be more persuasive if their demand for what domestic law must criminalize were clearer, if their international legal analysis were more rigorous and more focused, and if they justified the top-down approach they recommend here, which seems particularly problematic in this context.

The long history of human migration sets the stage for a probing engagement with current migration law and the challenges of bringing it into alignment with contemporary needs and rights. If very large scale movements of people are a constant element of life on earth, should we reconsider the migration panic that has gripped political leaders and their publics, and should we reassess the responses that are being advanced? Instead of crisis should we be talking of continuum, instead of restrictions on foreigner entry should we be considering support for human ingenuity and opportunity? Despite its scale, should we consider ways to extend to distress-migration the facilitatory infrastructure we routinely apply to business or service related human mobility?