Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669.

United States Supreme Court, June 28, 2006.

In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court held that suppression of evidence is not an appropriate remedy for violations of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and that U.S. states may apply their regular procedural default rules to bar claims brought under Article 36. The Court reached the latter conclusion despite contrary reasoning by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention provides that when one party country arrests nationals of another party country, it shall inform the foreign nationals without delay that they have the right to have their consulate notified of the arrest, and to communicate with the consulate. Article 36(2) adds that these rights “shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended.” The United States ratified the Vienna Convention in 1969, along with a protocol to the Convention providing that disputes between nations arising under the treaty could be heard in the ICJ.

The first telegraph had been in operation only a short time when a code was made available to the users of the new instrument. From that time to the present, codes for use in electrical communications have appeared in ever-increasing number. Two principal objects have been sought and achieved by their use: secrecy and economy. To the business man, the second of these objects is paramount; and code-makers have constantly endeavored to express an increasing amount of information in a given number of letters.

A difference of opinion of more than usual interest has recently developed with regard to the composition of the International Commission of the Danube. The question at issue turns upon the interpretation of certain articles of the Treaty of Versailles in the light of the important constitutional changes which have occurred within Germany since 1919. Under the Treaty of Versailles, the International Commission was to include “two representatives of German riparian States,” in addition to representatives of the other riparian and certain non-riparian States. Since the signature of the Treaty, there has been a gradual redistribution of powers within Germany, culminating in 1934 when the sovereign powers of the German states were transferred to the Reich. When the German representatives at the session of the International Commission in December, 1934, presented full powers issued in the name of the Reich alone, their eligibility was challenged, and they were allowed to take their seats only under a modus vivendi pending settlement of the issue. At the request of the British and French Governments, in which other States represented on the International Commission subsequently joined, the dispute was referred to the League of Nations Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit.

In my full-length article U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad, I argued that government-sponsored abduction from foreign countries was not only distasteful, but contrary to international law and U.S. constitutional law. Though I acknowledged that the reported decisions here and abroad did not, on the whole, support my argument, I suggested that these decisions were out of step with contemporary international law and current American views of due process of law. I expressed skepticism about many of the defenses of the practice that had been raised by American officials and had too often, in my judgment, been accepted by American courts. In particular, I urged that no great faith be placed in assertions by the U.S. Government that abduction of persons who ended up in American custody were carried out solely by the police of the foreign country, that the United States had no knowledge of or participation in torture, or that the foreign country really consented to the operation, though it could not say so publicly.

The actors in outer space have changed dramatically, involving not only new states but also private entities including start-ups, universities, and other new market entrants. The topics that require regulation have also changed, moving from broad principles to govern the initial stages of space exploration to much more complex questions with greater interests at stake. These topics include new kinds of activities, made possible by fast technological progress and often involving great potential for commercial gain, and also issues of growing concern for humankind as a whole with regard to the continued exploration and use of outer space. This essay looks at how new state participants view established and emerging international legal principles regulating space activities and highlights potential points of agreement or disagreement in that respect.

Nearly twenty years after the U.S. military began operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan, President Joseph R. Biden reported on August 31, 2021, that the last U.S. combat troops had departed the country. Biden announced on April 14, 2021, that the United States would withdraw combat troops from Afghanistan before the twenty-year anniversary of September 11, 2001, and NATO member states decided to depart the country simultaneously. The withdrawal followed an early 2020 deal between the Taliban and the Trump administration, which conditioned the pullout on Taliban agreement not to harbor terrorists that target the United States and its allies. Over the course of a week and a half in mid-August, the Taliban captured most of Afghanistan's provincial capitals, entering Kabul on August 15. The Afghan government collapsed, and President Ashraf Ghani fled the country. Through the end of August, the United States and other countries conducted a major airlift operation to evacuate their nationals and Afghans considered at risk of Taliban reprisals, though many were left behind amid risks of renewed civil war and humanitarian crisis.

If we have learned anything since the 2016 election, it is that foreign election interference is not just a strategic tool used by Russia. Many countries are now using social media disinformation as statecraft to attack democracies. With a relatively small investment of personnel and financial resources, a foreign power can use social media and other online tools to heighten divisions in the electorate, spread disinformation and conspiracy theories, and undermine confidence in the electoral system specifically and democratic institutions generally. The Biden administration should use the moral, political, and legal authorities of the Executive Branch to protect the United States from foreign election interference. In parallel, it should work cooperatively with allies to combat election interference using multilateral initiatives.

In their contribution to the AJIL Symposium, Robinson and MacNeil remark that a prolific legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) is that “it is now commonsense that rape is and must be a war crime.” This line distills the complexity of the legacies of the tribunals regarding sexual and gender-based violence. On the one hand, it articulates the critical role of the tribunals in cementing the idea that sexual violence, hitherto largely relegated to indifference in international criminal law and policy frameworks, is worthy of international attention. Simultaneously, it encapsulates the ways in which the tribunals’ jurisprudence has been received globally to narrate a narrow conception of conflict-related sexual violence as a “weapon of war” or committed as part of “strategic” conflict-related goals. In fact, there is little that constitutes common sense about sexual violence in conflict, nor is it always, or even most predominantly, committed as a war crime, crime against humanity,or in pursuit of genocide as envisaged by international criminal law. Various studies suggest that sexual violence in war takes many forms and causalities with differentiation across and within conflict contexts.

The situation of Ukrainians fleeing the Russian invasion exemplifies, as the organizers of this symposium note, both a shock to the international order and a powerful international response. Europeans, and Global North states more broadly, have welcomed Ukrainians with a generosity that sits in stark contrast to their treatment of the vast majority of contemporary refugees. This exceptional response demonstrates a key gap in the legal architecture, namely the absence of an international agreement on shared responsibility for hosting refugees. It also highlights a substantive shortcoming in international refugee law: its failure to protect most people fleeing armed conflict. In contrast, regional law from Africa and Latin America has for some time extended refugee protection to individuals escaping generalized violence. Beyond the substantive law, in many cases, regional protection is a preferable option for individuals fleeing violent conflict. In addition to these structural and substantive concerns, the exceptionally rapid and generous response to the Ukrainians demonstrates the deep politicization of international refugee policy and highlights the invidious role of race in the international legal order.