To those outside the anthropological disciplines, the Zulu are probably the best known chiefdom of southern Africa. Zulu military prowess acted as a sharp break on the process of colonial expansion in the nineteenth century and led to a series of battles which have been immortalized on celluloid and in the more popular historical accounts of the era. Despite this, the Zulu have prompted a comparatively sparse ethnography that is based largely on the work of nineteenth-century observers and is less comprehensive than the literature on some other southern African communities.

The literature on general peasant–state relations in history, in Africa today, or in Kenya in particular, tells us that the peasants have little systematic political leverage over state policy. While I broadly agree with this assessment, I would like to comment on an exception. The changing nature of self-help in Kenya is analysed in order to argue, first, that peasants, in collaboration with other classes in self-help, have had some leverage on state policy and budgets in the realm of basic needs; second, that the fact of peasant initiative and political strength over time has served to alter subtly some aspects of everyday peasant–state relations to peasant advantage; and third, that self-help has historically been a doubleedged political sword. But, before proceeding to the Kenya context, it is essential to review theoretical and empirical aspects of peasant political weakness in contemporary Africa.

This essay argues that courtship procedures, of which the giving of bridewealth forms a part, may under certain conditions help to socialize younger men into their mature economic roles. Further, in so far as bridewealth performs these functions, it contributes to the reproduction of labour in these economies.

During the 1970s the Tanzanian state moved a very substantial part of the rural population into nucleated settlements. This was followed by the setting up of new village institutions. It was villagization in a double sense: the creation of physical ‘villages’ from dispersed households and the establishment of corporate ‘villages’ (more precisely, village councils) intended to regulate the activities of those households. It was an intervention officially justified as a means of increasing collective consumption (through the provision of health care, schools and other services) and simultaneously of transforming an essentially traditional hoebased agricultural system (by facilitating the use of modern inputs). External commentators have seen it either as a large scale example of misguided bureaucratic practice (Coulson, 1977) or as part of a process of state expansion intended to increase control over peasant production (Bernstein, 1981; Hyden, 1980). My objective here is not to provide another theoretical commentary, but to show that ultimately any overall assessment of the impact of villagization must rest upon detailed analyses of particular local economies. I have restricted my discussion of this impact to household production.