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Our craving for generality has [as one] main source: our preoccupation with the method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using a generalization. Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue Book, p. 18
Naturalisms
For many philosophers and scientists, the word “naturalism” conjures up a metaphysical and a methodological thesis. Both concern objects that are out there in “nature,” meaning things that exist in space and time. The contrast is with supernatural entities; if such things exist, they exist outside of space and time:
Metaphysical naturalism: the only things that exist are things in nature.
Methodological naturalisms: scientific theories should not postulate the existence of things that are outside of nature.
I put an “s” subscript on the second naturalism to mark the fact that it gives advice about doing science. These two naturalisms are the ones that get cited in discussions of the conflict between evolutionary theory and creationism. Evolutionary biologists often say that their theory obeys the requirements of methodological naturalism but is silent on the metaphysical question. They further contend that creationism rejects both these naturalisms; here they are helped by creationists themselves, who often express their belief in a supernatural deity and argue that methodological naturalisms is a shackle from which science needs to break free. Although it is worth inquiring further into this interpretation of evolutionary theory and creationism, I won't do so here. Rather, I am interested in a third naturalism. Like the second, it is methodological, but it is aimed at the practice of philosophy, not of science (hence the “p” subscript that I use to label it):
Methodological naturalismp: philosophical theories should be evaluated by the same criteria that ought to be used in evaluating theories in natural science.
There are trivial similarities linking science and philosophy that lend a superficial plausibility to this naturalistic thesis.
Even while professionally engaged in banking, Sir John William Lubbock (1803–65) applied his formidable mind to scientific questions. Several of his early writings on astronomy - his particular sphere of interest - are gathered together in this reissue, notably On the Determination of the Distance of a Comet from the Earth, and the Elements of its Orbit (1832), On the Theory of the Moon and on the Perturbations of the Planets (1833), and An Elementary Treatise on the Computation of Eclipses and Occultations (1835). Lubbock received a Royal Society medal for tidal research in 1834, and herein is his Elementary Treatise on the Tides (1839). Also included is Lubbock's On the Heat of Vapours and on Astronomical Refractions (1840), in which he relates celestial observations to Gay-Lussac's gas expansion law. The collection closes with On the Discovery of the Planet Neptune (1861), Lubbock's lecture discussing how John Couch Adams first predicted the planet's existence.
An Anglican clergyman and fellow of the Royal Society, John Harris (c.1666–1719) was an important promulgator of Newtonian science, through private teaching, public lectures and published writing. His Lexicon Technicum (1704) may be considered the first encyclopaedia in English. In the present work, published in 1719, Harris presents for his well-to-do readership a series of didactic conservations between a gentleman of science and an aristocratic lady. He aims to induce 'persons of birth and fortune' to dedicate some of their 'happy leisure … to the improvement of their minds', and uses quotes from poets such as Samuel Butler and John Dryden to help elucidate scientific concepts. In particular, Harris explains the use of contemporary scientific apparatus (and expensive status symbols) such as terrestrial and celestial globes. The book ends with a description of the ultimate contemporary symbol of scientific refinement: the orrery, a working model of the solar system.
A member of the Académie française, Henri Poincaré (1854–1912) was one of the greatest mathematicians and theoretical physicists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. His discovery of chaotic motion laid the foundations of modern chaos theory, and he was acknowledged by Einstein as a key contributor in the field of special relativity. He earned his enduring reputation as a philosopher of mathematics and science with this elegantly written work, which was first published in French as three separate essays: Science and Hypothesis (1902), The Value of Science (1905), and Science and Method (1908). Poincaré asserts that much scientific work is a matter of convention, and that intuition and prediction play key roles. George Halsted's authorised 1913 English translation retains Poincaré's lucid prose style, presenting complex ideas for both professional scientists and those readers interested in the history of mathematics and the philosophy of science.
Long before their western counterparts, Chinese astronomers developed remarkably accurate methods for making their measurements, recording detailed observations since ancient times. Of particular interest to John Williams (1797–1874), assistant secretary to the Royal Astronomical Society, were Chinese observations of comets. Noting that previous translations of these records had been incomplete, Williams sought to produce a fuller catalogue. The present work, published in 1871, presents Chinese comet observations between 611 BCE and 1640 CE, using the encyclopaedia of Ma Duanlin and the great historical Shiji as major references. Williams provides useful context in his introductory remarks, mentioning the tests by which the accuracy of the Chinese records can be verified. He also includes chronological tables and a Chinese celestial atlas, enabling comparison between the Chinese and Western systems for dates and stars respectively.
First published in 1892, this important work by the mathematician Karl Pearson (1857–1936) presents a thoroughly positivist account of the nature of science. Pearson claims that 'the scientific method is the sole gateway to the whole region of knowledge', rejecting additional fields of inquiry such as metaphysics. He also emphasises that science can, and should, describe only the 'how' of phenomena and never the 'why'. A scholar of King's College, Cambridge, and later a professor at King's College and University College London, Pearson made significant contributions to the philosophy of science. Including helpful chapter summaries, this book explores in detail a number of scientific concepts, such as matter, energy, space and time. The work influenced such thinkers as Albert Einstein, who considered it to be essential reading when he created his study group, the Olympia Academy, at the age of twenty-three.
Born in rural Wales, to which he always felt a close connection, Joseph Harris (c.1704–64) moved to London in 1724, presenting the Astronomer Royal, Edmond Halley, with a testimonial of his mathematical ability. Harris then found work as an astronomer and teaching of navigation; his observations of magnetism and solar eclipses taken in Vera Cruz in 1726 and 1727 were relayed to the Royal Society by Halley. Harris' illustrated introduction to the solar system was originally printed for the instrument-maker Thomas Wright and the globe-maker Richard Cushee; it is here reissued in its 1731 first edition. Clearly describing the use of astronomical apparatus such as globes and orreries, it proved very popular, going through fourteen printings by 1793. Harris starts with an overview of the solar system and the fixed stars, and then shows how to solve astronomical problems using globes and orreries.
The Scottish mathematician and natural philosopher Sir John Leslie (1766–1832) had set out at the end of the eighteenth century to explore the nature of heat radiation, which he felt was a 'dubious and neglected' area of physics. Leslie's inquiry, published in 1804, details his many experiments, notably the use of two self-devised instruments: Leslie's cube and his differential thermometer. Establishing several basic laws of heat radiation and rejuvenating the debate about the physical composition of heat, Leslie's work gained him the Rumford medal of the Royal Society in 1805. Nevertheless, the same publication jeopardised his chances of obtaining an academic position at Edinburgh. A single, allegedly atheistic endnote, supporting David Hume's views on causation, prompted protests by the local clergymen when his candidature for the chair of mathematics was under consideration. Leslie secured the professorship, however, and remained with the university until his death.
The amateur scientist George John Singer (1786–1817) worked in the family business of artificial flower and feather making, but all his spare time was absorbed in the study of electricity and electromagnetism. He invented his own apparatus, including a gold-leaf electrometer, and built a laboratory-cum-lecture room at the back of his house: his public demonstrations were attended by Faraday and Francis Ronalds, and he was also a friend of the pioneering 'electrician' Andrew Crosse. This significant book, published in 1814, demonstrates the breadth of Singer's knowledge of his subject and of other contemporary work in the field. It describes in detail electric phenomena, in nature and in the laboratory, covering a wide range of experiments with and applications of electricity, and discussing the work of Franklin, Volta, Crosse and Dalton, among others. Sadly, Singer's promising scientific career was brought to an early end by tuberculosis: he died aged only thirty-one.
Although his yeoman father is said to have burnt his books to discourage excessive studiousness, Thomas Wright (1711–86) nevertheless acquired considerable knowledge in the fields of mathematics, navigation and astronomy. Later benefitting from the patronage of wealthy families, he also surveyed estates, designed gardens, and tutored aristocrats. He is best known, however, for his contribution to astronomy: this illustrated work of 1750 was his most famous publication. Written in the form of nine letters, the book quotes both poets and scientists in the opening discussion as Wright sets out to fuse, rather than separate, science and religion. Combining his observations of the Milky Way with his theological belief in a universe of perfect order, he notes, among other things, that our galaxy appears to be disc-shaped. While largely ignored by contemporary astronomers, Wright's ideas can be seen as a forerunner to more sophisticated conceptions of our galaxy's configuration.
When this work first appeared in 1767, electricity was seen as such a minor aspect of natural philosophy that its investigation was not considered a priority for contemporary scientists. The polymath Joseph Priestley (1733–1804) was one of the few who devoted serious effort to advancing the field. Here he charts the history of electrical study from experiments with amber in ancient Greece to the most recent discoveries. The book comprises explanations of the principal theories of electricity - both historical and contemporary - in addition to a selection of well-known experiments carried out by previous researchers. Priestley also details his own experiments, covering such topics as the colour of electric light, the effects of temperature, and even the musical tone of electrical discharges. One of his most successful works, testifying to the clarity of his explanations, the book remains an important text in the history of science.
Classical ergodicity retains its meaning in the quantum realm when the employed measurement is protective. This unique measuring technique is re-examined in the case of post-selection, giving rise to novel insights studied in the Heisenberg rep-resentation. Quantum statistical mechanics is then briefly described in terms of two-state density operators.
Introduction
In classical statistical mechanics, the ergodic hypothesis allows us to measure position probabilities in two equivalent ways: we can either measure the appropriate particle density in the region of interest or track a single particle over a long time and calculate the proportion of time it spent there. As will be shown below, certain quantum systems also obey the ergodic hypothesis when protectively measured. Yet, since Schrödinger's wave function seems static in this case [1, 2, 3], and Bohmian trajectories were proven inappropriate for calculating time averages of the particle's position [4, 5], we will perform our analysis in the Heisenberg representation.
Indeed, quantum theory has developed along two parallel routes, namely the Schrödinger and Heisenberg representations, later shown to be equivalent. The Schrödinger representation, due to its mathematical simplicity, has become more common. Yet, the Heisenberg representation offers some important insights which emerge in a more natural way, especially when employing modular variables [6]. For example, in the context of the two-slit experiment it sheds a new light on the question of momentum exchange [7, 8, 9]. Recently studied within the Heisenberg representation are also the double Mach–Zehnder interferometer [10] and the N-slit problem [11]. As can be concluded from [11], the Heisenberg representation prevails in emphasizing the non-locality in quantum mechanics, thus providing us with insights about this aspect of quantum mechanics as well.
Equipped with the backward evolving state-vector within the framework of two-state-vector formalism (TSVF) [12], the Heisenberg representation becomes even more powerful since the time evolution of the operators includes now information from the two boundary conditions.
We generalize protective measurement for protective joint measurement of several observables. The merit of joint protective measurement is the determination of the eigenstates of an unknown Hamiltonian rather than the determination of features of an unknown quantum state. As an example, we precisely determine the two eigenstates of an unknown Hamiltonian by a single joint protective measurement of the three Pauli matrices on a qubit state.
Introduction
Protective measurement is one of the unexpected consequences of the strange structure of quantum mechanics. According to general wisdom, we cannot gain information on the unknown state ρ of a single quantum system unless we distort the state itself. In particular, we cannot learn the unknown state of a single system whatever test we apply to it. It came as a surprise that in weak measurements [1] the expectation value 〈Â〉 of an observable  can be tested on a large ensemble of identically prepared unknown states in such a way that the distortions per single systems stay arbitrarily small (see [2], too). An indirectly related surprise came with the so-called protective measurements [3, 4, 5] capable of testing 〈Â〉 at least in an unknown eigenstate of the Hamiltonian Ĥ at arbitrarily small distortion of the state itself. Interesting debates followed the proposal as to the merit of protective measurement in the interpretation of the wave function of a single system instead of a statistical ensemble (see, e.g., [6] and references therein).
My work investigates an alternative merit of protective measurement. First I construct joint protective measurements of several observables Â1, Â2, … and re-state the original equations for them in a general form. Then I show that the straightforward task that a single joint protective measurement solves on a single system is the determination of the eigenstates of an otherwise unknown Hamiltonian.
In this chapter we show how the weak values, are related to the T0µ(x, t) component of the energy–momentum tensor. This enables the local energy and momentum to be measured using weak measurement techniques. We also show how the Bohm energy and momentum are related to T0µ(x, t) and therefore it follows that these quantities can also be measured using the same methods. Thus the Bohm “trajectories” can be empirically determined, as was shown by Kocsis et al. (2011a) in the case of photons. Because of the difficulties with the notion of a photon trajectory, we argue the case for determining experimentally similar trajectories for atoms where a trajectory does not cause these particular difficulties.
Introduction
The notion of weak measurement introduced by Aharonov, Albert and Vaidman (1988) and Aharonov and Vaidman (1990) has opened up a radically new way of exploring quantum phenomena. In contrast to the strong measurement (von Neumann, 1955), which involves the collapse of the wave function, a weak measurement induces a more subtle phase change which does not involve any collapse. This phase change can then be amplified and revealed in a subsequent strong measurement of a complementary operator that does not commute with the operator being measured. This amplification explains why it is possible for the result of a weak spin measurement of a spin-1/2 atom to be magnified by a factor of 100 (Aharonov et al., 1988; Duck, Stevenson and Sudarshan, 1989). A weak measurement, then, provides a means of amplifying small signals as well as allowing us to gain new, more subtle information about quantum systems.
One of the new features that we will concentrate on in this chapter is the possible measurement of the T0µ (x, t) components of the energy–momentum tensor.
One of the crucial issues about protective measurements is the extent to which they provide (additional) grounds for some realist understanding of the wave function. This issue is notoriously subject to debate, which is not the aim of this chapter. Rather, this chapter aims at clarifying the further issue of the ontological picture corresponding to the realist understanding of the wave function possibly suggested by protective measurements. Oddly enough, proponents of a realist reading of protective measurements remain in general rather vague about ontology (see for instance Aharonov et al. (1993, 4624), who assimilate the wave function to an “extended object” without further details, or the brief and somewhat unprecise discussion in Dickson (1995, 135–136) of the interpretation of the wave function within Bohmian mechanics (BM) and within the theoretical framework elaborated by Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (GRW); in this volume, Gao does propose a more elaborated ontological model for quantum mechanics (QM) based on protective measurements).
Despite this vagueness (or maybe because of it), it seems that the most obvious ontological intuition resulting from protective measurements points towards some form of straightforward realism about the wave function understood in the sense of a real, physical field: indeed, protective measurements are claimed to allow measuring expectation values of observables on a single quantum system, thereby providing the possibility of reconstructing (i.e. “measuring” in some sense) the wave function of a single quantum system. Aharonov et al. (1996, 125) clearly express this intuition: “We can observe the expectations values of operators, and we can observe the density and the current of the Schrödinger wave. We can “see” in some sense the Schrödinger wave. This leads us to believe that it has physical reality.”
Therefore, this kind of intuition seems in line with a realist conception of the wave function, according to which the wave function is considered as a real substantial, material in some sense) entity on its own (this view is often called “wave function realism”).
My view on the meaning of the quantum wave function and its connection to protective measurements is described. The wave function and only the wave function is the ontology of the quantum theory. Protective measurements support this view although they do not provide a decisive proof. A brief review of the discovery and the criticism of protective measurement is presented. Protective measurements with postselection are discussed.
Introduction
In the first graduate course of quantum mechanics I remember asking the question: “Can we consider the wave function as a description of a single quantum system?” I got no answer. Twelve years later, in South Carolina, after I completed my Ph.D. studies at Tel Aviv University under the supervision of Yakir Aharonov in which we developed the theory of weak measurements [1], I asked Aharonov: Can we use weak measurement to observe the wave function of a single particle?
At that time I had already become a strong believer in the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics [2] and had no doubt that a single system is described by the wave function. Yakir Aharonov never shared with me the belief in the MWI. When we realized that using what is called now protective measurement, we can, under certain conditions, observe the wave function of a single quantum system, he was really excited by the result. At 1992 I was invited to a conference on the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics in Japan where I presented this result: “The Schrödinger wave is observable after all!”[3]. Then I went home to Tel Aviv where I finished writing a letter which received mixed reviews in Phys. Rev. Lett., while Jeeva Anandan, working on the topic with Aharonov in South Carolina, wrote a paper accepted in Phys. Rev. A [4]. After acceptance of the PRA paper it was hard to fight the referees in PRL, but PLA accepted it immediately [5].