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The basic definition of Internet of Things (IoT) is introduced. A representative IoT architecture follows as well as the specific resources and services of IoT. Then, the chapter presents a survey on the economic analysis and pricing models for data collection in IoT. The issues include data aggregation and routing, relay selection, congestion management, resource allocation, task allocation, area coverage, and privacy management. Optimal pricing and privacy management for people-centric services in mobile crowdsensing network is next reviewed. Last, the chapter investigates the problem of providing incentives for users to participate in mobile crowdsourcing by applying the rank-order tournament as the incentive mechanism.
In this chapter, the problems of determining how the ownership of the resources affect the InP and service provider's incentives to invest and how to choose the most efficient investments in an MVN are studied. First, a general system model is developed in multiple infrastructure provider and service providers engaged in a complementary relationship to exchange multiple physical and virtual resources. Subsequently, for this formulated problem, the optimal investments are derived. Furthermore, the chapter gives detailed analysis of a special case and sheds light on the problem of ownership and investment efficiency by answering the question of whether the ownership of resources should be integrated or operated separately by the service provider and infrastructure provider. Simulation results assess the parameters that affect the efficiency of investment through simulations.
This chapter first introduces the basic concept of the cloud computing and cloud networking. A general cloud network architecture is presented and follows by the specific cloud systems, i.e., cloud data center networking, mobile cloud networking, and edge computing. Then, the chapter presents a survey on the game theoretic and auction models developed and applied to solve issues in cloud networking. Such issues include bandwidth reservation and allocation, request allocation, wireless bandwidth allocation, resource management in edge computing, and bandwidth allocation in software defined networking for cloud computing. The chapter then presents a cooperative game model for mobile cloud resource management in which the full formulation, algorithms, and performance evaluation are included. Finally, the chapter investigates how to provide efficient insurance in cloud computing market.