3 - The Changing Military Strategy and Reorganisation of Paramilitary Forces

Summary

Introduction

There was a major reorganisation and development of the paramilitary formations in Turkey in the early 1990s. Between 1991 and 1996, the Turkish security forces sought to improve their irregular warfare capacity by implementing the low-intensity conflict doctrine. While the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire in March 1993, and some steps were taken by state representatives toward a democratic solution of the Kurdish question, the leadership of the Turkish army remained adamant that it could only be settled by military means. This, it was convinced, required a transformed organisation and development of paramilitary forces.

Three aspects distinguished the political and military atmosphere in Turkey in the early 1990s from the previous period. The conditions before 1990 were: (1) Kurdish civilians were not made direct targets of the war, (2) the public space in Turkey had not yet been made supporter of the war by the nationalist political parties and the state, and (3) the violence used by the paramilitary forces was lower than in the 1990s and the paramilitary formations were smaller and predominantly intelligence groups. These military, political and ideological features began to change from the beginning of the 1990s. First, the war was not only between the security forces and the PKK, as in the previous period, primarily since the state authorities adopted a more complex war doctrine that also targeted Kurdish civilians, politicians and human rights advocates. Almost all the security and paramilitary forces were reorganised structurally and numerically within the framework of this doctrine. Second, the ideological propaganda of Turkish nationalism was heavily used; political parties became the cornerstone of the war with this nationalist campaign and the protectors of certain paramilitary formations. Finally, particularly intensive types of violence (unsolved murders, enforced disappearances, burning of villages, etc.) were put into effect, intimidating and threatening Kurdish civilians, whether they were pro-PKK or not. The violence of paramilitary groups was unrestricted and went out of control. This chapter addresses the question of how these paramilitary forces developed and reorganised and which were the causal factors in this transformation.