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Introduction

Robert Nola
Affiliation:
University of Auckland
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Summary

This book is a defence of the idea that there is such a thing as scientific method. It is also a defence of the idea that such methods can be justified, warranted or legitimized. There is a large core of people who think there is such a thing as a scientific method that can be justified, although not all agree as to what this might be. But there are also a growing number of people who think that there is no method to be justified. For some, the whole idea is yesteryear's debate, the continuation of which can be summed up as yet more of the proverbial “flogging a dead horse”. We beg to differ. There are reasons for the negative view, some of which will emerge as we investigate contemporary views for and against the existence of scientific method. Two sources of negativity come from different, but surprising, directions: first, from some scientists; secondly, from some philosophers alongside an even larger group of historians and sociologists of science and those in cultural studies.

Some scientists on method

The position of many scientists is amusingly characterized by the Nobel prizewinning scientist Peter Medawar, who was himself quite willing to take up the cudgels on behalf of scientific method (largely following Karl Popper). He tells us that scientists (he includes Charles Darwin) are often self-deceived about whether or not they have been following scientific methods; and if they have been following them, they are deceived about what these methods might be. He then adds that scientists: are not in the habit of thinking about matters of methodological policy. Ask a scientist what he conceives the scientific method to be, and he will adopt an expression that is at once solemn and shift y-eyed: solemn, because he feels he ought to declare an opinion; shift y-eyed, because he is wondering how to conceal the fact that he has no opinion to declare.

(Medawar 1984: 80)
Type
Chapter
Information
Theories of Scientific Method
An Introduction
, pp. 1 - 10
Publisher: Acumen Publishing
Print publication year: 2007

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  • Introduction
  • Robert Nola, University of Auckland
  • Book: Theories of Scientific Method
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844653881.001
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Save book to Dropbox

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  • Introduction
  • Robert Nola, University of Auckland
  • Book: Theories of Scientific Method
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844653881.001
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Introduction
  • Robert Nola, University of Auckland
  • Book: Theories of Scientific Method
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844653881.001
Available formats
×