Terrorism and Extremism in Indonesia and the Southeast Asian Region

Summary

COVID-19, combined with intensive security operations and changing international dynamics, kept most local terrorist organizations off balance in 2021. In Indonesia, arrests were high and fatalities low, with terrorists responsible for five deaths, all in Poso, Central Sulawesi. Several attempts at attacks elsewhere, including the March 2021 bombing of Makassar cathedral, resulted in injuries to bystanders, but no deaths, other than the suicide bombers themselves. Almost no one tried to go overseas to join a jihad, and no one came back from Syria or was deported from Turkey.

Malaysia continued to patrol the coast of Sabah, occasionally deporting or killing Abu Sayyaf Group suspects, but no arrests of Malysians on terrorism charges took place during the year, either in Sabah or the rest of the country. In the Philippines, the military continued to try and “neutralize” top leaders, with top pro-ISIS leaders among those killed. Singapore arrested a few citizens with violent extremist sympathies. A Singaporean teenager arrested in December 2020 remains the only Southeast Asian detained for far-right sympathies. He reportedly wanted to attack two mosques in Singapore on the anniversary of the Christchurch, New Zealand shootings.

The return to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan raised concerns of possible renewed activity of al-Qaeda in the region or of a blowback to Southeast Asia of heightened activity from ISIS–Khorasan, the so-called province of Islamic State in Afghanistan. At least in the short term, these were probably overdrawn. While many Muslims celebrated the victory of a Muslim army over the United States, there were no immediate candidates for a partnership with al-Qaeda, even if the Taliban return gave the latter state protection. Its old partner, Jemaah Islamiyah, had no interest in resuming an affiliation and in any case since 2019 had become the target of a major crackdown by police. Its immediate aim was organizational survival, not global jihad. Pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia, as elsewhere, saw al-Qaeda as the enemy. Indeed, if Indonesian authorities were worried about outside influence serving as inspiration for violence at home, the source was more likely to be ISIS–Khorasan attacks on the Taliban rather than anything al-Qaeda was doing.