4 - In defense of type materialism

Summary

If the arguments up to this point have been successful, we have reason to hope that type materialism is correct. We have encountered arguments that purport to show that type materialism is superior to dualism and the double-aspect theory, and also some arguments that purport to show that functionalism is badly flawed. In view of these arguments, it looks as though the only alternatives to accepting type materialism are (1) to deny the existence of our subject matter (that is, to reject the realist attitude toward sensations that we have assumed from the start), and (2) to accept the nihilistic view that sensations exist but are too elusive to be caught in the net of any metaphysical theory. Although there are people who favor (1) or (2), most of us would be deeply distressed if we were forced to embrace one of them.

Still, it would be premature to infer that type materialism is true; for there are a number of objections against it, and some of these objections have a certain amount of prima facie appeal. Indeed, there are objections against it that are widely thought to be conclusive.

The objections are of three kinds. First, there are arguments that dualists have constructed with a view to showing that their position is to be preferred to token materialism. Type materialism implies token materialism, and it is therefore at risk from all of the arguments that are directed against the latter.