Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-xbtfd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-15T07:28:25.896Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

V - Lessons for Central Bank Independence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 November 2024

Sean Holly
Affiliation:
University of Cambridge
Michael McMahon
Affiliation:
University of Oxford
Stephen Millard
Affiliation:
National Institute of Economic and Social Research
Anna Watson
Affiliation:
University of Cambridge
Get access
Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Aikman, David (2021), ‘How has the Financial Policy Committee’s objective changed since its inception?’ Macroprudential Matters, 9 December.Google Scholar
Bank of England (2021), ‘Evaluation of the Bank of England’s approach to quantitative easing’. Independent Evaluation Office Report.Google Scholar
Campbell, Jeffrey R., Evans, Charlie L., Fisher, Jonas D. M., and Justiniano, Alejandro (2012), ‘Macroeconomic effects of Federal Reserve forward guidance’, in Romer David and Justin Wolfers (eds.) Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring. Brooking Institute Press, 1–80.Google Scholar
Powell, Jerome (2023), Sveriges Riksbank Panel on ‘Central bank independence and the mandate – evolving views’. Federal Reserve Board, 10 January.Google Scholar
Steven, Cecchetti and Tucker, Paul (2021), ‘Understanding how central banks use their balance sheets: A critical categorisation’. 1 June VoxEU.org. Centre for Economic Policy Research.Google Scholar
Tucker, Paul (2002), ‘Quantitative easing, monetary policy implementation, and the public finances’. Institute for Fiscal Studies Green Budget 2002, chapter 7.Google Scholar
Tucker, Paul (2018), Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State. Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Tucker, Paul (2020), ‘Solvency as a fundamental constraint on LOLR policy for independent central banks: Principles, history, law’, Journal of Financial Crises. 2(2), 133.Google Scholar
Tucker, Paul (2021), ‘The fed appointments process should be overhauled’, Financial Times, 23 November.Google Scholar
Wessel, David (2018), ‘Alternatives to the Fed’s 2 percent inflation target’. Brookings, 7 June, pp. 13, 17.Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×