Book contents
- Reflections on Monetary Policy after 25 Years of the MPC
- Macroeconomic Policy Making
- Reflections on Monetary Policy after 25 Years of the MPC
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- I Overview
- II Communication
- 3 Reliable Partners
- 4 MPC Monetary Communication
- 5 Central Bank Communication
- III Targets and Instruments
- IV MPC Process
- V Lessons for Central Bank Independence
- Annex: Details on the methodology for the classification of level of disagreement
- Index
- References
5 - Central Bank Communication
Never Excuse, Never Explain
from II - Communication
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 November 2024
Book contents
- Reflections on Monetary Policy after 25 Years of the MPC
- Macroeconomic Policy Making
- Reflections on Monetary Policy after 25 Years of the MPC
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- I Overview
- II Communication
- 3 Reliable Partners
- 4 MPC Monetary Communication
- 5 Central Bank Communication
- III Targets and Instruments
- IV MPC Process
- V Lessons for Central Bank Independence
- Annex: Details on the methodology for the classification of level of disagreement
- Index
- References
Summary
For most of the 20th century and earlier, central banks went about their business without ever feeling the need to communicate what they were doing to the financial markets or the general public. Then from around 1990 onwards, central banks became ever more transparent, trying to make clear to the markets and the public what they were doing and why. The purpose of this chapter is to understand why this change came about and how successful it has been.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Reflections on Monetary Policy after 25 Years of the MPC , pp. 70 - 76Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024
References
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