Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-dzt6s Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-23T00:14:56.761Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

5 - Central Bank Communication

Never Excuse, Never Explain

from II - Communication

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 November 2024

Sean Holly
Affiliation:
University of Cambridge
Michael McMahon
Affiliation:
University of Oxford
Stephen Millard
Affiliation:
National Institute of Economic and Social Research
Anna Watson
Affiliation:
University of Cambridge
Get access

Summary

For most of the 20th century and earlier, central banks went about their business without ever feeling the need to communicate what they were doing to the financial markets or the general public. Then from around 1990 onwards, central banks became ever more transparent, trying to make clear to the markets and the public what they were doing and why. The purpose of this chapter is to understand why this change came about and how successful it has been.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Campbell, Jeffrey R, Evans, Charles L, Fisher, Jonas D M and Justiniano, Alessandro (2012), ‘Macroeconomic effects of Federal Reserve forward guidance’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 43, 180.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chadha, Jagjit S and Nolan, Charles (2001), ‘Inflation targeting, transparency and interest rate volatility: Ditching ‘monetary mystique’ in the United Kingdom’, Journal of Macroeconomics. 23, 349–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eggertsson, Gauti B and Woodford, Michael (2003), ‘The zero bound on interest rates and optimal monetary policy’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 34, 139235.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goodfriend, Marvin (1986), ‘Monetary mystique: Secrecy and central banking’, Journal of Monetary Economics. 17, 6392.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greenspan, Alan (2007), The Age of Turbulence. Penguin Press.Google Scholar
Haberis, Alex, Harrison, Richard and Waldron, Matthew (2017), ‘Uncertain forward guidance’, Bank of England Working Paper No. 654.Google Scholar
Krugman, Paul R (1998), ‘It’s baaack: Japan’s slump and the return of the liquidity trap’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 29, 137206.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lasaosa, Ana (2005), ‘Learning the rules of the new game? Comparing the reactions in financial markets to announcements before and after the Bank of England’s operational independence’, Bank of England Working Paper No. 255.Google Scholar
Werning, Ivan (2011), ‘Managing a liquidity trap: Monetary and fiscal policy’, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 17, 344.Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×