Chapter 10 - The Rationality of Milosevic

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Ironically, the names of the couple that led the country into political and economic chaos referred to freedom and peace. Slobodan signifies freedom and Milosevic would become known as ‘Sloba-Sloboda’ no longer merely referring to the name, but relating it to the concept itself. His wife Mirjana, who would later also become a prominent figure in Serbian politics, carries a name which is a derivative from Mir (peace) (Stevanovic, 2004, p. 1; 5). Their legacy could not have been more different. As Chapter 8 argued, Milosevic was influential in orchestrating Yugoslavia's demise and the bloodshed that came along with it.

Milosevic in the past has been labelled a cold apparatchik, referred to as ‘the slickest con man in the Balkans’, has been called the ‘devil of Dedinje’ and eventually would be known as ‘the butcher of the Balkans’ (Post, 2004, p. 179; Stevanovic, 2004, p. 1). In those scenarios Milosevic is often portrayed as a ‘dangerous mad man’ (translated from Detrez, 2002, p. 7) and has been described as ‘neurotic’ (Stevanovic, 2004, p. 2). However, there are no indications Milosevic was actually mad and conclusions that a leader suffers from mental disorders need to be handled with care. As Detrez points out, any policy – especially those coming from the international community – is not served by the perception of the other as crazy (Detrez, 2002, pp. 7-8). While strong indications of a particular psychological disorder may be very telling and can be taken into account when devising foreign policy, (e.g. Glad, 2002) if this is merely an assumption that has no basis, as appears to have been the case with Milosevic, it can be very counterproductive. It is also questionable to what extent this was merely an image painted of Milosevic in the popular media or whether it actually impacted diplomats and other politicians. Anecdotal evidence seems to indicate that they did not perceive Milosevic as crazy or suffering from serious mental disorders. Quite the opposite, at least by 1993 Milosevic was seen by foreign diplomats as someone with whom it was possible to negotiate and reach an understanding (Doder & Branson, 1999, p. 89). The present chapter will use the work of Max Weber to assess the extent to which either of the two types of rationality, dominated the decision-making process of Milosevic throughout his life.