Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Preface to this edition
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 Bayesianism
- 2 The philosophical and psychological significance of Bayesian
- 3 Bayesian decision theories: some details
- 4 The counterexamples
- 5 Causal decision theories
- 6 Common causes, reasons and symptomatic acts
- 7 A general defense of PMCEU
- 8 Newcomb's paradox
- Appendix 1 Logic
- Appendix 2 Probability
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Preface to this edition
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 Bayesianism
- 2 The philosophical and psychological significance of Bayesian
- 3 Bayesian decision theories: some details
- 4 The counterexamples
- 5 Causal decision theories
- 6 Common causes, reasons and symptomatic acts
- 7 A general defense of PMCEU
- 8 Newcomb's paradox
- Appendix 1 Logic
- Appendix 2 Probability
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Rational Decision and Causality , pp. 206 - 211Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2016
References
& (1980). Applying the Jeffrey decision model to rational betting and information acquisition. Theory and Decision, 12, 1–20.Google Scholar
(1958). The paradoxes of confirmation. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 9, 227–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1953). Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque: critique des postulats et axiomes de l'école americaine. Econometrica, 21, 503–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1973). On the subjective probability of compound events. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 9, 396–406.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
& (1972). Newcomb's paradox revisited. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 23, 295–304.Google Scholar
& (1967). Value: behavioral decision theory. Annual Review of Psychology, 18, 239–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1966). Notes on the “paradoxes of confirmation”n Aspects of Inductive Logic, ed. and , pp. 175–97. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company.
(1976) (ed.). Local Induction. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
(1967). A simultaneous axiomatization of utility and subjective probability. Philosophy of Science, 34, 333–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1933). The nature of believing. In Knowledge and Belief, ed. , pp. 28–40. (1973). London: Oxford University Press.
(1953). Scientific Explanation. New York: Harper & Brothers.
(1976). Conditionalization and expected utility. Philosophy of Science, 43, 415–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1950). Logical Foundations of Probability, (1962). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
(1981). Quine and the confirmational paradoxes. In Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6: Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, ed. , & , pp. 425–52. University of Minnesota Press.
(1948). Theory of Experimental Inference. New York: The Macmillan Company.
(1981). Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4, 317–31.Google Scholar
, & (1967). Testing expectation theories of decision making without measuring utility or subjective probability. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 4, 72–103.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1937). Foresight: its logical laws, its subjective sources. Trans. in Studies in Subjective Probability, ed. & , pp. 93–158. (1964). New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
(1970). Theory of Probability: A Critical Introductory Treatment, trans. & , vol. 1. (1973). New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
(1979). Bayesian personalism, the methodology of scientific research programmes, and Duhem's problem. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 10, 177–87.Google Scholar
(1961). Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75, 643–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1961). Distortion of subjective probabilities as a reaction to uncertainty. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75, 670–89.Google Scholar
& (1978). Counterfactuals and two kinds of expected utility. In Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory, ed. , & , vol. 1, pp. 125–62. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
(1980). Theory and Evidence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
(1967). The white shoe is a red herring. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 17, 322.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1955). Fact, Fiction and Forecast, (1973). Indianapolis: The Bobbs–Merrill Company, Inc.
(1967). Slightly more realistic personal probability. Philosophy of Science, 34, 311–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1945). Studies in the logic of confirmation. In his Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, pp. 3–46. (1965). New York: The Free Press.
(1960). Inductive inconsistencies. In his Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, pp. 53–79. (1965). New York: The Free Press.
(1974). The Structure of Scientific Inference. Berkeley: University of California Press.
(1970). Bayesian information usage. In Information and Inference, ed. & , pp. 28–57. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.CrossRef
(1958). Probability Theory in Science and Engineering, Colloquium Lectures in Pure and Applied Science, no. 4, Field Research Laboratory, Socony Mobil Oil, Dallas. (Lecture 5, The A
p
distribution, pp. 152–87.)
(1956). Valuation and acceptance of scientific hypotheses. Philosophy of Science, 23, 237–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1965
b). The Logic of Decision. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
(1977). Savage's omelet. In PSA 1976, ed. & , vol. 2, pp. 361–71. East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association.
(1978). Axiomatizing the logic of decision. In Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory, vol. 1, ed. , and , pp. 227–31. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
(198l
a). Choice, chance and credence. In Philosophy of Language/Philosophical Logic, ed. & , pp. 367–86. The Hague: Nijhoff.
& (1972). Subjective probability: a judgment of representativeness. Cognitive Psychology, 3, 430–54.Google Scholar
& (1979). The Dutch book argument: its logical flaws, its subjective sources. Philosophical Studies, 36, 19–33.Google Scholar
, , & (197l). Foundations of Measurement, vol. 1. New York: Academic Press.
(1978). Subjective probability: criticisms, reflections, and problems. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 7, 157–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1765). New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, trans. , (1949). La Salle, Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Company.
(1979). Prisoners’ Dilemma is a Newcomb problem. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 8, 235–40.Google Scholar
(1968). Descriptive and normative implications of the decision-theory postulates. In Risk and Uncertainty, ed. & , pp. 3–23. New York: Saint Martin's Press.CrossRef
(1963). The paradox of confirmation. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 13, 265–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1971). The Matter of Chance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(1980). Consciousness and degrees of belief. In Prospects for Pragmatism: Essays in Honor of F. P. Ramsey, ed. , pp. 139–73. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(1966). A paradox of information. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 17, 59–61.Google Scholar
(1967). On the consistency of preferences in Allais’ paradox. Behavioral Science, 12, 373–83.Google Scholar
(1969). Newcomb's problem and two principles of choice. In Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel, ed. , et al, pp. 114–46. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.CrossRef
(1968). Theory of Measurement. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
(1969). Natural kinds. In his Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, pp. 114–38. New York: Columbia University Press.
(1961). Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms: comment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75, 690–4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1926). Truth and probability. In his The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays, ed. , pp. 156–98. (1931). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Republished in his Foundations, ed. D. H. Mellor, pp. 58–100. (1978). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Also in Studies in Subjective Probability, ed. H. E. Kyburg & H. E. Smokler, pp. 61–92. (1964). New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
& (1972). Individual decision behavior. Annual Review of Psychology, 23, 131–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
(1976). Simplicity. In Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science, ed. & , vol. 1, pp. 167–203. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
(1953). The scientist qua scientist makes value judgments. Philosophy of Science, 20, 1–6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1954). The Foundations of Statistics, 1972. New York: Dover Publications, Inc.
(1967). Difficulties in the theory of personal probability. Philosophy of Science, 34, 305–10.Google Scholar
(1963). The Anatomy of Inquiry. Indianapolis: The Bobbs–Merrill Company, Inc.
(1974). The unpredictability of free choices. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 25, 209–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1980
a). Causal Necessity: A Pragmatic Investigation of the Necessity of Laws. New Haven: Yale University Press.
(1980
b). Higher order degrees of belief. In Prospects for Pragmatism: Essays in Honor of F. P. Ramsey, ed. , pp. 109–37. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
, & (1977). Behavioral decision theory. Annual Review of Psychology, 28, 1–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
& (1971). Comparison of Bayesian and regression approaches to the study of information processing in judgment. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 6, 649–744.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(1956). The role of subjective probability and utility in decision-making. In Proceedings of the Third Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability, vol. 5, ed. , pp. 61–73. Berkeley: University of California Press.
(1960). Some open problems in the foundations of subjective probability. In Information and Decision Processes, ed. , pp. 162–9. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
(1961). The philosophical relevance of decision theory. The Journal of Philosophy, 58, 605–14.Google Scholar
(1966). A Bayesian approach to the paradoxes of confirmation. In Aspects of Inductive Logic, ed. & , pp. 198–207. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company.CrossRef
(1973). An Introduction to Confirmation Theory. London: Methuen.
(1976). Conditionalization, observation and change of preference. In Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science, vol. 1, ed. and , 205–59. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.CrossRef
(1967
a). Additivity, utility and subjective probability. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 4, 75–201.Google Scholar
(1967
b). Utility theory and additivity analysis of risky choices. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 75, 27–36.Google Scholar
& (1971). Belief in the law of small numbers. Psychological Bulletin, 76, 105–10.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
& (1973). Availability: a heuristic for judging frequency and probability. Cognitive Psychology, 5, 207–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
& (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases. Science, 185, 1124–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
& (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science, 211, 453–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
& (1947). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton: Princeton University Press.