Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Market Associations: An Overview
- 3 Conducting a Representative Survey of Informal Traders
- 4 A Calm Sea Does not Make a Good Sailor: A Theory of Private Good Governance
- 5 Government Threats and Group Leader Strength
- 6 Business is Secret: Government Threats and Within-Group Competition
- 7 Private Groups in Comparative Perspective
- A Appendix to Chapter 2 – Market Associations: An Overview
- B Appendix to Chapter 3 – Conducting a Representative Survey of Informal Traders
- C Appendix to Chapter 4 – A Calm Sea Does not Make a Good Sailor: A Theory of Private Good Governance
- D Appendix to Chapter 6 – Government Threats and Within-Group Competition
- E Appendix to Chapter 7 – Private Groups in Comparative Perspective
- Bibliography
- Index
3 - Conducting a Representative Survey of Informal Traders
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 July 2021
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Market Associations: An Overview
- 3 Conducting a Representative Survey of Informal Traders
- 4 A Calm Sea Does not Make a Good Sailor: A Theory of Private Good Governance
- 5 Government Threats and Group Leader Strength
- 6 Business is Secret: Government Threats and Within-Group Competition
- 7 Private Groups in Comparative Perspective
- A Appendix to Chapter 2 – Market Associations: An Overview
- B Appendix to Chapter 3 – Conducting a Representative Survey of Informal Traders
- C Appendix to Chapter 4 – A Calm Sea Does not Make a Good Sailor: A Theory of Private Good Governance
- D Appendix to Chapter 6 – Government Threats and Within-Group Competition
- E Appendix to Chapter 7 – Private Groups in Comparative Perspective
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Chapter 3 describes how high quality and representative data was collected from traders, with an emphasis on sampling and survey strategies that could apply broadly to surveys of informal populations.It describes a trader census of tens of thousands of shops, how traders were sampled from this census, and strategies to reduce the likelihood that – for example – an enumerator avoids a shop where a trader is busy and picks the shop without customers. Next the chapter introduces strategies to increase trust with skeptical respondents, and strategies to enforce sampling and survey protocols. Last, the chapter discusses the brute-force approach to defining market association membership, and discusses implications for future researchers who aim to identify associational membership in a population.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Politics of Order in Informal MarketsHow the State Shapes Private Governance, pp. 34 - 48Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021