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11 - Owing God Worship

from Part III - Normative Aspects

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2025

By
Mark C. Murphy
Edited by
Aaron Segal  and
Samuel Lebens
Aaron Segal
Affiliation:
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Samuel Lebens
Affiliation:
University of Haifa, Israel
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Summary

We have little basis to doubt (a) that we have good reasons to worship God, (b) that God is worthy of worship, (c) that worship of God is reasonable, (d) that it is unreasonable not to worship God, and (e) that worshipping God is obligatory. But none of these normative states of affairs amounts to or entails our owing God worship. The central aim of this chapter is to show that we do not by nature owe God worship; our owing God worship could be no more than a contingent matter. That our owing God worship is contingent does not entail or even suggest that there is any imperfection or limitation in God, and there are good reasons to hold that it is an attractive view of the relationship between God and humans that our owing God worship is a matter of a special contingent relationship between God and us rather than something that holds by nature.

Keywords

Godworshipreasonsobligationjusticeowingdutydirected duty
Type
Chapter
Information
The Philosophy of Worship
Divine and Human Aspects
 , pp. 189 - 208
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

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