5 - Epistemology and philosophical psychology

Summary

If we see metaphysics as directed from the top of the Neoplatonic hierarchy downwards to the sensible and material realm, then in learning, concept formation and acquisition of knowledge the direction is reversed, from the bottom upwards. Here, too, however, the higher hypostases are prior to the extent that they endow the human soul with all its powers and have ontological priority. Also, the intelligibles serve as the foundations for knowledge. Nonetheless, methodologically and developmentally, human beings start with bodily functions and perception, and only arrive at dialectic and knowledge – if at all – through arduous conceptual and philosophical work based on both experience and rational capacities.

The Neoplatonists have sometimes been taken as philosophers who show no interest in the normal faculties and functions of the human beings living the composite life of the soul in a body. Their contribution has been seen, rather, to lie within the field of spiritual and otherworldly experiences, or at best, in metaphysics. This view is simply mistaken and outdated or at least heavily oversimplified. The numerous commentaries the Neoplatonists wrote on Aristotle's De anima alone testify to this effect. By necessity, human beings are tied to the world of matter, change and perception, and consequently their mental life also involves, to a great extent, items and happenings in that world. The explananda are phenomena and experiences of the sensible, even though the explanans, ultimately, is always found higher up in the hierarchy.