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Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Maps, Figures, and Tables
- List of Qing Dynasty Emperors' Reign Dates
- List of Weights and Measures
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Economic Change, Social Conflict, and Property Rights
- 2 “Population Increases Daily”: Economic Change during the Eighteenth Century
- 3 “As Before Each Manage Their Own Property”: Boundary and Water-rights Disputes
- 4 “Crafty and Obdurate Tenants”: Redemption, Rent Defaults, and Evictions
- 5 Temporal and Geographic Distributions of Property-rights Disputes in Guangdong
- 6 Violence North, West, and South: Property-rights Disputes in Shandong, Sichuan, and Guangdong
- 7 “You Will Be Rich but Not Benevolent”: Changing Concepts of Legitimacy and Violent Disputes
- 8 Conclusion
- Appendix
- Bibliography
- Index
7 - “You Will Be Rich but Not Benevolent”: Changing Concepts of Legitimacy and Violent Disputes
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 October 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Maps, Figures, and Tables
- List of Qing Dynasty Emperors' Reign Dates
- List of Weights and Measures
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Economic Change, Social Conflict, and Property Rights
- 2 “Population Increases Daily”: Economic Change during the Eighteenth Century
- 3 “As Before Each Manage Their Own Property”: Boundary and Water-rights Disputes
- 4 “Crafty and Obdurate Tenants”: Redemption, Rent Defaults, and Evictions
- 5 Temporal and Geographic Distributions of Property-rights Disputes in Guangdong
- 6 Violence North, West, and South: Property-rights Disputes in Shandong, Sichuan, and Guangdong
- 7 “You Will Be Rich but Not Benevolent”: Changing Concepts of Legitimacy and Violent Disputes
- 8 Conclusion
- Appendix
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
In the preceding chapters, we have examined the economic conditions that created the potential for conflict, the issues that caused violent disputes, and the temporal and geographic patterns of disputes. A more nettlesome question remains: Why did individuals resort to violence? Homicidal violence was not a preferred method of resolving property disputes, nor was it very effective. The futility of violence is readily manifest when we consider that two-thirds of the parties who initiated violence ended up as homicide victims. Given the risks entailed in taking violent action, it seems reasonable to assume that the parties to a dispute would have availed themselves of more peaceful methods of conflict resolution, if such a remedy was available; yet in 630 homicides (combining both samples used in this study), we find that only 14% of disputants (86 cases) took their cases to court. Disputes that ended in lethal violence despite efforts at official adjudication attest to the depth of the social tensions in the eighteenth century. These disputes also offer insights into why many people resorted to violence. Focusing on disputes that were preceded by lawsuits discloses the process of adjudicating property-rights disputes and reveals the limits of state power, even when fairly and competently exercised, to enforce property rights. This focus also highlights the competing visions of social justice and economic self-interest in rural society, which were at the heart of many violent disputes.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Manslaughter, Markets, and Moral EconomyViolent Disputes over Property Rights in Eighteenth-Century China, pp. 193 - 218Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2000