Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword by William B. Quandt
- Acknowledgements
- Prologue
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Kissinger's legacy and imprint on the Middle East
- Part I Jordan in the Carter Middle East policy
- Part II Jordan in the Reagan Middle East policy
- 6 The evolution of Reagan's strategy
- 7 The US, Israel and Jordan: collaboration and discord
- 8 Two cases of collaboration and discord
- 9 The US and Jordan: how ‘much’ became ‘too much’
- Part III US, Jordan and Arab approaches to peace
- Appendices
- Notes
- Select bibliography
- Index
- Cambridge Middle East Library
9 - The US and Jordan: how ‘much’ became ‘too much’
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword by William B. Quandt
- Acknowledgements
- Prologue
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Kissinger's legacy and imprint on the Middle East
- Part I Jordan in the Carter Middle East policy
- Part II Jordan in the Reagan Middle East policy
- 6 The evolution of Reagan's strategy
- 7 The US, Israel and Jordan: collaboration and discord
- 8 Two cases of collaboration and discord
- 9 The US and Jordan: how ‘much’ became ‘too much’
- Part III US, Jordan and Arab approaches to peace
- Appendices
- Notes
- Select bibliography
- Index
- Cambridge Middle East Library
Summary
Jordan and Lebanon
The repercussions of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and of the US intervention and premature withdrawal, were deeply worrying to Jordan. In its view, peace between Israel and Lebanon should have been addressed after Israeli and Syrian forces had withdrawn from the country, as part of a comprehensive peace between Israel and its neighbours and not before. It also thought that the US Marines and the MNF should have stayed until Syrian and Israeli forces were withdrawn and national reconciliation among the warring domestic factions was under way.
The American failure in Lebanon harmed Jordan, in the sense that the ensuing confrontation between Syria and Israel brought about a radical shift in the balance of power which was of vital consequence for the political middle ground in the region. Their respective desires to dominate the area were seen as leading Israel formally to annex the West Bank, and to leave the territorial integrity of Lebanon permanently compromised. This trial of strength, it was feared, would expose Jordan to mounting pressures from the west as well as the north, accompanied by a further influx of refugees as a result of the social and economic dislocation inflicted on the Palestinians both at home and in exile abroad. Social disruption in Jordan would follow, as American-backed Israelis and Soviet-backed Syrians battled it out for dominance in the region as a whole. Furthermore, it was feared then that superpower support would encourage both Israel and Syria to establish strategic links between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea-Gulf theatres.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1993