Book contents
- Holding Out
- Cambridge Military Histories
- Holding Out
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Maps
- Tables
- Acknowledgements
- Comparative Ranks
- Chronology
- Abbreviations
- General key to maps
- Introduction
- 1 Context
- 2 Principles
- 3 Organisation
- 4 Personality
- 5 Intelligence
- 6 Communication
- 7 Learning
- 8 Performance
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- Holding Out
- Cambridge Military Histories
- Holding Out
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Maps
- Tables
- Acknowledgements
- Comparative Ranks
- Chronology
- Abbreviations
- General key to maps
- Introduction
- 1 Context
- 2 Principles
- 3 Organisation
- 4 Personality
- 5 Intelligence
- 6 Communication
- 7 Learning
- 8 Performance
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Traditional principles studied in this chapter – mission command (decentralisation) and partnership between a commander and his chief of staff – are seen as a special characteristic of German command. Part of the mechanism for handling the first command task, co-ordinating a mass army. Why mission command’s implementation was limited in Western Front conditions, and how granting autonomy of action could go badly wrong. Lack of trust in subordinates, risk aversion, the growing complexity of battle, shortages of manpower and matériel and good communications led to increased micro-management.
Mission command linked to the partnership between a commander and his chief staff officer, the command team. Composition, strengths and weaknesses of the commander and general staff officer cadres. Great efforts to create effective command teams: reasonably successful in terms of their duration, less so in the vital combined arms balance required by modern battle. General staff officers increasingly influential, but commanders remained important.
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- Holding OutThe German Army and Operational Command in 1917, pp. 60 - 90Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2023