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4 - Realism, Beyond Miracles

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Axel Mueller
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University
Arthur Fine
Affiliation:
Professor of philosophy and adjunct professor of physics, University of Washington
Yemima Ben-Menahem
Affiliation:
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
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Summary

Two things about Hilary Putnam have not changed throughout his career: some (including Putnam himself) have regarded him as a “realist” and some have seen him as a philosopher who changed his positions (certainly with respect to realism) almost continually. Apparently, what realism meant to him in the 1960s, in the late seventies and eighties, and in the nineties, respectively, are quite different things. Putnam indicates this by changing prefixes: scientific, metaphysical, internal, pragmatic, commonsense, but always realism. Encouraged by Putnam's own attempts to distinguish his views from one time to another, his work is often regarded as split between an early period of “metaphysical realism” (his characterization) and a later and still continuing period of “internal realism”. Late Putnam is understood to be a view that insists on the primacy of our practices, while the early period is taken to be a view from outside these, a “God's Eye view”. As Putnam himself stresses (1992b), this way of dividing his work obscures continuities, the most important of which is a continuing attempt to understand what is involved in judging practices of inquiry, like science, as being objectively correct. Thus Putnam's early and his current work appear to have more in common than the division between “early” and “late” suggests. In fact, Putnam's earlier writings owe much of their critical force to his adopting the pragmatic perspective of an open-minded participant in practices of empirical inquiry, a stance not explicitly articulated in these writings but rather taken simply as a matter of course.

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Hilary Putnam , pp. 83 - 124
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2005

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  • Realism, Beyond Miracles
    • By Axel Mueller, Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University, Arthur Fine, Professor of philosophy and adjunct professor of physics, University of Washington
  • Edited by Yemima Ben-Menahem, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
  • Book: Hilary Putnam
  • Online publication: 08 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614187.004
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  • Realism, Beyond Miracles
    • By Axel Mueller, Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University, Arthur Fine, Professor of philosophy and adjunct professor of physics, University of Washington
  • Edited by Yemima Ben-Menahem, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
  • Book: Hilary Putnam
  • Online publication: 08 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614187.004
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Realism, Beyond Miracles
    • By Axel Mueller, Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University, Arthur Fine, Professor of philosophy and adjunct professor of physics, University of Washington
  • Edited by Yemima Ben-Menahem, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
  • Book: Hilary Putnam
  • Online publication: 08 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614187.004
Available formats
×