3 - The self-positing subject and theoretical self-consciousness

Summary

This chapter marks the beginning of our attempt to reconstruct in some detail the theory of subjectivity centered around Fichte's notion of the self-positing subject. In this respect our interpretation is based upon one of the few claims about Fichte with which everyone can agree, namely, that the concept most fundamental to his theory of subjectivity is that of the self-positing subject, or, alternatively, “the absolute I.” Unfortunately, once we venture beyond this most general claim, consensus among interpreters of Fichte essentially ceases. This is evidenced not only by the lack of any generally accepted, comprehensive interpretation of Fichte's thought, but also by the fact that there is widespread disagreement over the most elementary aspects of his principal doctrines, including that of the self-positing subject. For this reason one of our main aims here is simply to articulate in as coherent a form as possible the content of the conception of the subject that Fichte came to espouse. This alone is a sufficiently formidable task, given the obscurity of the texts involved and the great divergence of opinion among expositors of Fichte at even this basic interpretive level. This expository aspect of our project will be guided by the hypothesis that Fichte's development of the theory of the absolute subject is best understood as an attempt to come to terms with some of the implications of Kant's theory of self-consciousness – especially the doctrine of transcendental apperception – and to do so within an essentially Critical framework.