8 - The Nature of Deference

Summary

The Logic of Deference

The Limits of Deference

My aim thus far has been to show that four recurring examples of human interaction – friendship, promise-keeping, fair play, and political obligation – can be re-presented as examples of the duty to defer to the views of others even if those views are incorrect or misguided. In this chapter, I consider somewhat more fully the normative basis for the argument for deference, including limits on the argument's reach. I also help illustrate and defend the argument by comparing other theories about the duty to obey the law that share similarities with the theory sketched here.

Forms and Varieties of Communities

In previous chapters, we considered two major types of community, competitive and cooperative, and indicated how the duty to defer may depend on the argument for preferring one or the other in particular contexts. I do not suggest that these broad types are exhaustive of the kinds of communities one might encounter, but only that they are particularly prominent alternatives that figure in the argument for deference. While it would be a mistake to assume that the four paradigm examples discussed here are the only examples that raise the question of deference, one must be careful not to so weaken the argument for deference that it collapses into a question of common courtesy. The varieties of relationships and occasions in which such questions might arise are as limitless as the human ability to imagine and form associations.