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Yoram Barzel; Douglas W. Allen

doi:10.1017/9781009374712.023

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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 August 2023

Yoram Barzel and

Douglas W. Allen

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Yoram Barzel: Affiliation:
University of Washington
Douglas W. Allen: Affiliation:
Simon Fraser University, British Columbia

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Type: Chapter
Information: Economic Analysis of Property Rights , pp. 261 - 272

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009374712.023 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2023

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