Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface to the Third Edition
- Preface to the Second Edition
- Preface to the First Edition
- Part I Conceptualissues
- 1 The Neoclassical Problem
- 2 Economic Property Rights
- 3 Transaction Costs
- 4 Information Costs
- 5 The Theory of Economic Property Rights
- Part II Contracts, Organizations, And Institutions
- 6 Exchange, Contracts, and Contract Choice
- 7 Divided Ownership and Organization
- 8 Institutions
- Part III Establishing Property Rights
- 9 Capture in the Public Domain
- 10 Forming Property Rights
- 11 Benefits of the Public Domain
- Part IV Non-Price Allocation And Other Issues
- 12 Nonwage Labor Markets
- 13 Property Rights in Non-market Allocations
- 14 Additional Property Rights Applications
- 15 The Property Rights Model
- References
- Index
- Political Economy of Institutions And Decisions
6 - Exchange, Contracts, and Contract Choice
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 August 2023
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface to the Third Edition
- Preface to the Second Edition
- Preface to the First Edition
- Part I Conceptualissues
- 1 The Neoclassical Problem
- 2 Economic Property Rights
- 3 Transaction Costs
- 4 Information Costs
- 5 The Theory of Economic Property Rights
- Part II Contracts, Organizations, And Institutions
- 6 Exchange, Contracts, and Contract Choice
- 7 Divided Ownership and Organization
- 8 Institutions
- Part III Establishing Property Rights
- 9 Capture in the Public Domain
- 10 Forming Property Rights
- 11 Benefits of the Public Domain
- Part IV Non-Price Allocation And Other Issues
- 12 Nonwage Labor Markets
- 13 Property Rights in Non-market Allocations
- 14 Additional Property Rights Applications
- 15 The Property Rights Model
- References
- Index
- Political Economy of Institutions And Decisions
Summary
Output is higher when individuals cooperate and combine their inputs in some type of production. This exposes the attributes of their inputs to other people. Since contracts and agreements cannot prevent overuse of someone elses attributes, transaction costs arise in every form of human production interaction. Specific contracts are designed to mitigate this problem.
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- Economic Analysis of Property Rights , pp. 81 - 109Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2023