Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- Introduction
- 1 Truth and Meaning
- 2 Philosophy of Action
- 3 Radical Interpretation
- 4 Philosophy of Mind and Psychology
- 5 Semantics and Metaphysics of Events
- 6 Knowledge of Self, Others, and World
- 7 Language and Literature
- Bibliography of Davidson's Publications
- Selected Commentary on Davidson
- Bibliographic References
- Name Index
- Subject Index
- References
Bibliography of Davidson's Publications
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 December 2009
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Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- Introduction
- 1 Truth and Meaning
- 2 Philosophy of Action
- 3 Radical Interpretation
- 4 Philosophy of Mind and Psychology
- 5 Semantics and Metaphysics of Events
- 6 Knowledge of Self, Others, and World
- 7 Language and Literature
- Bibliography of Davidson's Publications
- Selected Commentary on Davidson
- Bibliographic References
- Name Index
- Subject Index
- References
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- Chapter
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- Donald Davidson , pp. 207 - 213Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003
References
1980. Essays on Actions and Events. New York: Clarendon Press. Second edition published in 2001. The second edition adds two appendices, “Adverbs of Actions” and “Reply to Quine on Events.”
1984. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. New York: Clarendon Press. Second edition published in 2001. The second edition adds an appendix, “Replies to Lewis and Quine,” to Chapter 10, “Belief and the Basis of Meaning.”
2001. Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. New York: Clarendon Press
Forthcoming. Volume 4, Problems of Rationality. New York: Clarendon Press
Forthcoming. Volume 5, Truth, Language and History. New York: Clarendon Press
1952. Why Study Philosophy?View Point, 2, 22–4
1955. Outline of a Formal Theory of Value. Philosophy of Science, 22, 140–60. (With J. J. C. McKinsey and Patrick Suppes.)CrossRef
1955. The Return of Reason in Ethics. In T. Kimura (Ed.), Analysis of the American Way of Thinking. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press. (In Japanese.)
1956. A Finitistic Axiomatization of Subjective Probability and Utility. Econometrica, 24, 264–75. (With Patrick Suppes.)CrossRef
1959. Experimental Tests of a Stochastic Decision Theory. In C. W. Churchman and P. Ratoosh (Eds.), Measurement: Definitions and Theories (pp. 233–69). New York: Wiley and Sons. (With J. Marschak.)
1963. The Method of Intension and Extension. In A. Schilpp (Ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (pp. 311–49). La Salle, Ill.: Open Court
1966.2 Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages. In Y. Bar-Hillel (Ed.), Proceedings of the 1964 International Congress for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (pp. 383–94). Amsterdam: North Holland
1967.1 The Logical Form of Action Sentences. In N. Rescher (Ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action (pp. 81–95). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press
1969. Facts and Events. In J. Margolis (Ed.), Fact and Existence (pp. 74–84). Oxford: Blackwell
1969.1 The Individuation of Events. In N. Rescher (Ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel (pp. 216–34). Dordrecht: D. Reidel
1970.1 How Is Weakness of the Will Possible? In J. Feinberg (Ed.), Moral Concepts (pp. 93–113). Oxford: Oxford University Press
1970.1 Mental Events. In L. Foster and J. Swanson (Eds.), Experience and Theory (pp. 79–102). Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press
1970.2 Semantics for Natural Languages. In Linguaggi nella Societa e nella Tecnica. Milan: Comunita
1971.1 Agency. In R. Binkley, R. Bronaugh, and A. Marras (Eds.), Agent, Action, and Reason (pp. 3–37). Toronto: University of Toronto Press
1973.1 Freedom to Act. In T. Honderich (Ed.), Essays On Freedom of Action (pp. 137–56). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
1973.2 In Defence of Convention T. In H. Leblanc (Ed.), Truth, Syntax and Modality (pp. 76–86). Dordretch: North-Holland
1973.1 The Material Mind. Paper presented at the Fourth International Congress for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Dordrecht, Holland
1973. 2Radical Interpretation. Dialectica, 27, 314–28
1974. 2On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 47, 5–20
1974.1 Psychology as Philosophy. In S. C. Brown (Ed.), Philosophy of Psychology (pp. 41–52). London: Macmillan
1975.2 Thought and Talk. In S. Guttenplan (Ed.), Mind and Language (pp. 7–23). Oxford: Oxford University Press
1976. 1Hempel on Explaining Action. Erkenntnis, 10, 239–53
1976.2 Reply to Foster. In G. Evans and J. McDowell (Eds.), Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics (pp. 33–41). Oxford: Oxford University Press
1978.1 Intending. In Y. Yovel (Ed.), Philosophy of History and Action (pp. 41–60). Dordretch: D. Reidel and The Magnes Press
1979.2 Moods and Performances. In A. Margalit (Ed.), Meaning and Use (pp. 9–20). Dordrecht: D. Reidel
1980.1 Comments and Replies. In Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 239–44). New York: Clarendon Press
1980. 5Toward a Unified Theory of Meaning and Action. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 11, 1–12CrossRef
1982. 3Empirical Content. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 17, 471–89
1982.4 Paradoxes of Irrationality. In R. Wollheim et al. (Eds.), Philosophical Essays on Freud (pp. 289–305). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1983.3 A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge. In D. Henrich (Ed.), Kant oder Hegel? (pp. 423–38). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta
1983. 2Communication and Convention. The Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1, 13–25. Published in 1984 in Synthese, 59, 3–18
1984.4Expressing Evaluations. Lawrence, Kan.: Lindley
1985.1 Adverbs of Action. In B. Vermazen (Ed.), Essays on Davidson (pp. 230–41). Oxford: Clarendon Press
1985.4 Deception and Division. In E. Lepore (Ed.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (pp. 138–48). Oxford: Blackwell. Also published in 1986 in J. Elster (Ed.), The Multiple Self (pp. 79–92). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1985. 4Incoherence and Irrationality. Dialectica, 39, 345–54
1985.1 Reply to Quine on Events. In E. Lepore (Ed.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (pp. 172–6). Oxford: Blackwell
1986.4 Judging Interpersonal Interests. In J. Elster and A. Hylland (Eds.), Foundations of Social Choice Theory (pp. 195–211). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1986.5 A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs. In E. Lepore (Ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell. Also published in 1986 in R. E. Grandy (Ed.), Philosophical Grounds of Rationality (pp. 157–74). Oxford: Oxford University Press
1987.3 Afterthoughts, 1987. In A. Malichowski (Ed.), Reading Rorty (pp. 120–38). Cambridge: Blackwell
1987. 3Knowing One's Own Mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 60(3), 441–58CrossRef
1987.4 Problems in the Explanation of Action. In P. Pettit (Ed.), Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J. J. C. Smart (pp. 35–49). New York: Blackwell
1988.3 Epistemology and Truth. Proceedings of the Fourth Panamerican Philosophy Conference, Cordoba, Argentina
1989. The Conditions of Thought. In J. Brandl and W. L. Gombocz (Eds.), The Mind of Donald Davidson (pp. 193–200). Amsterdam: Rodopi
1989.3 The Myth of the Subjective. In M. Krausz (Ed.), Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation (pp. 159–72). Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press
1989.3 What Is Present to the Mind? In J. Brandl and W. Gombocz (Eds.), The Mind of Donald Davidson (pp. 3–18). Amsterdam: Rodopi
1990.5 Meaning, Truth and Evidence. In R. Barret and R. F. Gibson (Eds.), Perspectives on Quine (pp. 68–79). Cambridge: Blackwell
1990.4 Representation and Interpretation. In W. H. Newton-Smith and K. V. Wilkes (Eds.), Modelling the Mind (pp. 12–26). Oxford: Oxford University Press
1990.4 Turing's Test. In W. H. Newton-Smith and K. V. Wilkes (Eds.), Modelling the Mind (pp. 1–11). Oxford: Oxford University Press
1991.3 Three Varieties of Knowledge. Philosophy, 30(supp.), 153–66. Also published in 1991 in A. P. Griffiths (Ed.), A. J. Ayer: Memorial Essays (pp. 153–66). New York: Cambridge University Press
1991.3 What Is Present to the Mind. In E. Villanueva (Ed.), Consciousness (Vol. 6) (pp. 97–214). Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview
1992.5 The Socratic Conception of Truth. In K. J. Boudouris (Ed.), The Philosophy of Socrates: Elenchus, Ethics and Truth (pp. 51–8). Athens: International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture
1993.5 Locating Literary Language. In R. W. Dasenbrock (Ed.), Literary Theory after Davidson (pp. 295–308). University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press
1993. 5Method and Metaphysics. Deucalion, 11, 239–48
1993.5 Plato's Philosopher. In R. W. Sharples (Ed.), Modern Thinkers and Ancient Thinkers (pp. 1–15). Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. Also published in 1993 in Apeiron, 26(3–4), 179–94
1993. Reply to Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore's ‘Is Radical Interpretation Possible?’ In R. Stoecker (Ed.), Reflecting Davidson (pp. 77–84). New York: de Gruyter
1993. Thinking Causes. In J. Heil and A. Mele (Eds.), Mental Causation (pp. 3–17). New York: Clarendon Press
1994.5 Dialectic and Dialogue. In G. Preyer (Ed.), Language, Mind, and Epistemology: On Donald Davidson's Philosophy (pp. 429–37). Dordrecht: Kluwer
1994. Donald Davidson. In S. Guttenplan (Ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (pp. 231–6). Oxford: Blackwell
1994. Exchange between Donald Davidson and W. V. Quine following Davidson's Lecture. Theoria, 60(3), 226–31
1994. On Quine's Philosophy. Theoria, 60(3), 184–92
1994. Radical Interpretation Interpreted. In J. Tomberlin (Ed.), Philosophical Perspectives: Logic and Language (Vol. 8) (pp. 121–28). Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview
1994.5 The Social Aspect of Language. In B. McGuinness (Ed.), The Philosophy of Michael Dummett (pp. 1–16). Dordrecht: Kluwer
1995. 4Could There Be a Science of Rationality?International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 3(1), 1–16CrossRef
1995. Laws and Cause. Dialectica, 49(2–4), 263–79
1995.4 The Objectivity of Values. In C. Gutiérrez (Ed.), El Trabajo Filosófico de Hoy en el Continente (pp. 59–69). Bogatá: Editorial ABC
1995. 4The Problem of Objectivity. Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 57(2), 203–20
1995.5 Pursuit of the Concept of Truth. In P. Leonardi and M. Santambrogio (Eds.), On Quine: New Essays (pp. 7–21). New York: Cambridge University Press
1996.3 Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. In P. Coates and D. Ituito (Eds.), Current Issues in Idealism (pp. 155–76). Bristol: Thoemmes
1997. The Centrality of Truth. In J. Peregrin (Ed.), The Nature of Truth: Proceedings of the International Colloquium (pp. 3–14). Prague: Filosofia
1997.5 Gadamer and Plato's Philebus. In L. Hahn (Ed.), The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer (pp. 421–32). Chicago: Open Court
1997.3 Indeterminism and Antirealism. In C. B. Kulp (Ed.), Realism/Antirealism and Epistemology (pp. 109–22). Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield
1997.5 Seeing through Language. In J. Preston (Ed.), Thought and Language (pp. 15–28). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1997.4 Who Is Fooled? In J.-P. Dupuy (Ed.), Self-Deception and Paradoxes of Rationality (pp. 1–18). Stanford: CSLI Publications
1998.3 The Irreducibility of the Concept of the Self. In M. Stamm (Ed.), Philosophie in Synthetisher Absicht (pp. 123–30). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta
1998.5 Replies. Crítica, 30, 97–112. Replies to articles by Barry Stroud, John McDowell, Richard Rorty, and Carlos Pereda in Crítica, 28 (1998)
1999. 3The Emergence of Thought. Erkenntnis, 51(1), 7–17
1999. Intellectual Autobiography. In L. E. Hahn (Ed.), The Philosophy of Donald Davidson (pp. 3–70). Chicago: Open Court
1999. Interpretation: Hard in Theory, Easy in Practice. In M. D. Caro (Ed.), Interpretations and Causes: New Perspectives on Donald Davidson's Philosophy (pp. 31–44). Dordrecht: Kluwer
1999. Spinoza's Causal Theory of the Affects. In Y. Yovel (Ed.), Desire and Affect: Spinoza as Psychologist (pp. 95–112). New York: Little Room Press
1999. Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry? Discussion with Rorty. In U. M. Zeglen (Ed.), Donald Davidson: Truth, Meaning and Knowledge (pp. 17–19). London: Routledge
2000.4 Objectivity and Practical Reason. In E. Ullmann-Margalit (Ed.), Reasoning Practically (pp. 17–26). Oxford: Oxford University Press
2000. Perils and Pleasures of Interpretation. Ars Interpretandi, 5, 21–37
2000.5 Truth Rehabilitated. In R. B. Brandom (Ed.), Rorty and His Critics (pp. 65–74). Cambridge: Blackwell
2001. Externalisms. In P. Kotatko, P. Pagin, and G. Segal (Eds.), Interpreting Davidson (pp. 1–16). Stanford: CSLI Publications
1957. Decision Making: An Experimental Approach. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. (With Patrick Suppes.)
1990. Plato's Philebus. New York: Garland. (1949 Harvard dissertation.)
1969. Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine. Dordrecht: Reidel. (With Jaakko Hintikka.) Rev. ed. 1975. (With Jaakko Hintikka and W. V. Quine.)
1970. Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (With Carl Hempel and Nicholas Rescher.)
1972. Semantics of Natural Language. Boston: D. Reidel. (With Gilbert Harman.) A second edition was published in 1977 with additional essays by Saul Kripke and others
1975. The Logic of Grammar. Encino, Calif.: Dickenson. (With Gilbert Harman.)
1997. In Conversation: Donald Davidson (19 videocassettes, 1460 min.). Introduced and edited by R. Fara. London: Philosophy International Centre for Philosophy of the Natural and Social Sciences, London School of Economics
1980. Essays on Actions and Events. New York: Clarendon Press. Second edition published in 2001. The second edition adds two appendices, “Adverbs of Actions” and “Reply to Quine on Events.”
1984. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. New York: Clarendon Press. Second edition published in 2001. The second edition adds an appendix, “Replies to Lewis and Quine,” to Chapter 10, “Belief and the Basis of Meaning.”
2001. Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. New York: Clarendon Press
Forthcoming. Volume 4, Problems of Rationality. New York: Clarendon Press
Forthcoming. Volume 5, Truth, Language and History. New York: Clarendon Press
1952. Why Study Philosophy?View Point, 2, 22–4
1955. Outline of a Formal Theory of Value. Philosophy of Science, 22, 140–60. (With J. J. C. McKinsey and Patrick Suppes.)CrossRef
1955. The Return of Reason in Ethics. In T. Kimura (Ed.), Analysis of the American Way of Thinking. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press. (In Japanese.)
1956. A Finitistic Axiomatization of Subjective Probability and Utility. Econometrica, 24, 264–75. (With Patrick Suppes.)CrossRef
1959. Experimental Tests of a Stochastic Decision Theory. In C. W. Churchman and P. Ratoosh (Eds.), Measurement: Definitions and Theories (pp. 233–69). New York: Wiley and Sons. (With J. Marschak.)
1963. The Method of Intension and Extension. In A. Schilpp (Ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (pp. 311–49). La Salle, Ill.: Open Court
1966.2 Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages. In Y. Bar-Hillel (Ed.), Proceedings of the 1964 International Congress for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (pp. 383–94). Amsterdam: North Holland
1967.1 The Logical Form of Action Sentences. In N. Rescher (Ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action (pp. 81–95). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press
1969. Facts and Events. In J. Margolis (Ed.), Fact and Existence (pp. 74–84). Oxford: Blackwell
1969.1 The Individuation of Events. In N. Rescher (Ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel (pp. 216–34). Dordrecht: D. Reidel
1970.1 How Is Weakness of the Will Possible? In J. Feinberg (Ed.), Moral Concepts (pp. 93–113). Oxford: Oxford University Press
1970.1 Mental Events. In L. Foster and J. Swanson (Eds.), Experience and Theory (pp. 79–102). Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press
1970.2 Semantics for Natural Languages. In Linguaggi nella Societa e nella Tecnica. Milan: Comunita
1971.1 Agency. In R. Binkley, R. Bronaugh, and A. Marras (Eds.), Agent, Action, and Reason (pp. 3–37). Toronto: University of Toronto Press
1973.1 Freedom to Act. In T. Honderich (Ed.), Essays On Freedom of Action (pp. 137–56). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
1973.2 In Defence of Convention T. In H. Leblanc (Ed.), Truth, Syntax and Modality (pp. 76–86). Dordretch: North-Holland
1973.1 The Material Mind. Paper presented at the Fourth International Congress for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Dordrecht, Holland
1973. 2Radical Interpretation. Dialectica, 27, 314–28
1974. 2On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 47, 5–20
1974.1 Psychology as Philosophy. In S. C. Brown (Ed.), Philosophy of Psychology (pp. 41–52). London: Macmillan
1975.2 Thought and Talk. In S. Guttenplan (Ed.), Mind and Language (pp. 7–23). Oxford: Oxford University Press
1976. 1Hempel on Explaining Action. Erkenntnis, 10, 239–53
1976.2 Reply to Foster. In G. Evans and J. McDowell (Eds.), Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics (pp. 33–41). Oxford: Oxford University Press
1978.1 Intending. In Y. Yovel (Ed.), Philosophy of History and Action (pp. 41–60). Dordretch: D. Reidel and The Magnes Press
1979.2 Moods and Performances. In A. Margalit (Ed.), Meaning and Use (pp. 9–20). Dordrecht: D. Reidel
1980.1 Comments and Replies. In Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 239–44). New York: Clarendon Press
1980. 5Toward a Unified Theory of Meaning and Action. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 11, 1–12CrossRef
1982. 3Empirical Content. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 17, 471–89
1982.4 Paradoxes of Irrationality. In R. Wollheim et al. (Eds.), Philosophical Essays on Freud (pp. 289–305). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1983.3 A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge. In D. Henrich (Ed.), Kant oder Hegel? (pp. 423–38). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta
1983. 2Communication and Convention. The Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1, 13–25. Published in 1984 in Synthese, 59, 3–18
1984.4Expressing Evaluations. Lawrence, Kan.: Lindley
1985.1 Adverbs of Action. In B. Vermazen (Ed.), Essays on Davidson (pp. 230–41). Oxford: Clarendon Press
1985.4 Deception and Division. In E. Lepore (Ed.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (pp. 138–48). Oxford: Blackwell. Also published in 1986 in J. Elster (Ed.), The Multiple Self (pp. 79–92). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1985. 4Incoherence and Irrationality. Dialectica, 39, 345–54
1985.1 Reply to Quine on Events. In E. Lepore (Ed.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (pp. 172–6). Oxford: Blackwell
1986.4 Judging Interpersonal Interests. In J. Elster and A. Hylland (Eds.), Foundations of Social Choice Theory (pp. 195–211). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1986.5 A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs. In E. Lepore (Ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell. Also published in 1986 in R. E. Grandy (Ed.), Philosophical Grounds of Rationality (pp. 157–74). Oxford: Oxford University Press
1987.3 Afterthoughts, 1987. In A. Malichowski (Ed.), Reading Rorty (pp. 120–38). Cambridge: Blackwell
1987. 3Knowing One's Own Mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 60(3), 441–58CrossRef
1987.4 Problems in the Explanation of Action. In P. Pettit (Ed.), Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J. J. C. Smart (pp. 35–49). New York: Blackwell
1988.3 Epistemology and Truth. Proceedings of the Fourth Panamerican Philosophy Conference, Cordoba, Argentina
1989. The Conditions of Thought. In J. Brandl and W. L. Gombocz (Eds.), The Mind of Donald Davidson (pp. 193–200). Amsterdam: Rodopi
1989.3 The Myth of the Subjective. In M. Krausz (Ed.), Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation (pp. 159–72). Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press
1989.3 What Is Present to the Mind? In J. Brandl and W. Gombocz (Eds.), The Mind of Donald Davidson (pp. 3–18). Amsterdam: Rodopi
1990.5 Meaning, Truth and Evidence. In R. Barret and R. F. Gibson (Eds.), Perspectives on Quine (pp. 68–79). Cambridge: Blackwell
1990.4 Representation and Interpretation. In W. H. Newton-Smith and K. V. Wilkes (Eds.), Modelling the Mind (pp. 12–26). Oxford: Oxford University Press
1990.4 Turing's Test. In W. H. Newton-Smith and K. V. Wilkes (Eds.), Modelling the Mind (pp. 1–11). Oxford: Oxford University Press
1991.3 Three Varieties of Knowledge. Philosophy, 30(supp.), 153–66. Also published in 1991 in A. P. Griffiths (Ed.), A. J. Ayer: Memorial Essays (pp. 153–66). New York: Cambridge University Press
1991.3 What Is Present to the Mind. In E. Villanueva (Ed.), Consciousness (Vol. 6) (pp. 97–214). Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview
1992.5 The Socratic Conception of Truth. In K. J. Boudouris (Ed.), The Philosophy of Socrates: Elenchus, Ethics and Truth (pp. 51–8). Athens: International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture
1993.5 Locating Literary Language. In R. W. Dasenbrock (Ed.), Literary Theory after Davidson (pp. 295–308). University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press
1993. 5Method and Metaphysics. Deucalion, 11, 239–48
1993.5 Plato's Philosopher. In R. W. Sharples (Ed.), Modern Thinkers and Ancient Thinkers (pp. 1–15). Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. Also published in 1993 in Apeiron, 26(3–4), 179–94
1993. Reply to Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore's ‘Is Radical Interpretation Possible?’ In R. Stoecker (Ed.), Reflecting Davidson (pp. 77–84). New York: de Gruyter
1993. Thinking Causes. In J. Heil and A. Mele (Eds.), Mental Causation (pp. 3–17). New York: Clarendon Press
1994.5 Dialectic and Dialogue. In G. Preyer (Ed.), Language, Mind, and Epistemology: On Donald Davidson's Philosophy (pp. 429–37). Dordrecht: Kluwer
1994. Donald Davidson. In S. Guttenplan (Ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (pp. 231–6). Oxford: Blackwell
1994. Exchange between Donald Davidson and W. V. Quine following Davidson's Lecture. Theoria, 60(3), 226–31
1994. On Quine's Philosophy. Theoria, 60(3), 184–92
1994. Radical Interpretation Interpreted. In J. Tomberlin (Ed.), Philosophical Perspectives: Logic and Language (Vol. 8) (pp. 121–28). Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview
1994.5 The Social Aspect of Language. In B. McGuinness (Ed.), The Philosophy of Michael Dummett (pp. 1–16). Dordrecht: Kluwer
1995. 4Could There Be a Science of Rationality?International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 3(1), 1–16CrossRef
1995. Laws and Cause. Dialectica, 49(2–4), 263–79
1995.4 The Objectivity of Values. In C. Gutiérrez (Ed.), El Trabajo Filosófico de Hoy en el Continente (pp. 59–69). Bogatá: Editorial ABC
1995. 4The Problem of Objectivity. Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 57(2), 203–20
1995.5 Pursuit of the Concept of Truth. In P. Leonardi and M. Santambrogio (Eds.), On Quine: New Essays (pp. 7–21). New York: Cambridge University Press
1996.3 Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. In P. Coates and D. Ituito (Eds.), Current Issues in Idealism (pp. 155–76). Bristol: Thoemmes
1997. The Centrality of Truth. In J. Peregrin (Ed.), The Nature of Truth: Proceedings of the International Colloquium (pp. 3–14). Prague: Filosofia
1997.5 Gadamer and Plato's Philebus. In L. Hahn (Ed.), The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer (pp. 421–32). Chicago: Open Court
1997.3 Indeterminism and Antirealism. In C. B. Kulp (Ed.), Realism/Antirealism and Epistemology (pp. 109–22). Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield
1997.5 Seeing through Language. In J. Preston (Ed.), Thought and Language (pp. 15–28). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1997.4 Who Is Fooled? In J.-P. Dupuy (Ed.), Self-Deception and Paradoxes of Rationality (pp. 1–18). Stanford: CSLI Publications
1998.3 The Irreducibility of the Concept of the Self. In M. Stamm (Ed.), Philosophie in Synthetisher Absicht (pp. 123–30). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta
1998.5 Replies. Crítica, 30, 97–112. Replies to articles by Barry Stroud, John McDowell, Richard Rorty, and Carlos Pereda in Crítica, 28 (1998)
1999. 3The Emergence of Thought. Erkenntnis, 51(1), 7–17
1999. Intellectual Autobiography. In L. E. Hahn (Ed.), The Philosophy of Donald Davidson (pp. 3–70). Chicago: Open Court
1999. Interpretation: Hard in Theory, Easy in Practice. In M. D. Caro (Ed.), Interpretations and Causes: New Perspectives on Donald Davidson's Philosophy (pp. 31–44). Dordrecht: Kluwer
1999. Spinoza's Causal Theory of the Affects. In Y. Yovel (Ed.), Desire and Affect: Spinoza as Psychologist (pp. 95–112). New York: Little Room Press
1999. Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry? Discussion with Rorty. In U. M. Zeglen (Ed.), Donald Davidson: Truth, Meaning and Knowledge (pp. 17–19). London: Routledge
2000.4 Objectivity and Practical Reason. In E. Ullmann-Margalit (Ed.), Reasoning Practically (pp. 17–26). Oxford: Oxford University Press
2000. Perils and Pleasures of Interpretation. Ars Interpretandi, 5, 21–37
2000.5 Truth Rehabilitated. In R. B. Brandom (Ed.), Rorty and His Critics (pp. 65–74). Cambridge: Blackwell
2001. Externalisms. In P. Kotatko, P. Pagin, and G. Segal (Eds.), Interpreting Davidson (pp. 1–16). Stanford: CSLI Publications
1957. Decision Making: An Experimental Approach. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. (With Patrick Suppes.)
1990. Plato's Philebus. New York: Garland. (1949 Harvard dissertation.)
1969. Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine. Dordrecht: Reidel. (With Jaakko Hintikka.) Rev. ed. 1975. (With Jaakko Hintikka and W. V. Quine.)
1970. Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (With Carl Hempel and Nicholas Rescher.)
1972. Semantics of Natural Language. Boston: D. Reidel. (With Gilbert Harman.) A second edition was published in 1977 with additional essays by Saul Kripke and others
1975. The Logic of Grammar. Encino, Calif.: Dickenson. (With Gilbert Harman.)
1997. In Conversation: Donald Davidson (19 videocassettes, 1460 min.). Introduced and edited by R. Fara. London: Philosophy International Centre for Philosophy of the Natural and Social Sciences, London School of Economics