7 - Theistic Naturalism Part 1

Summary

In the previous chapter, I brought the standard noninterventionist, incompatibilist model of divine action into conversation with naturalism. I argued that causal joint theories ironically presuppose a version of scientistic naturalism in which divine action is rendered anomalous and extraneous to the normal state of affairs in the natural world. In response to this theological capitulation to scientistic naturalism, I then discussed the differences between various versions of naturalism. Naturalism, I argued, is not a necessarily reductionist, physicalist, or monolithic metaphysical framework, but includes nuanced and expansive perspectives on what it means to be natural. Finally, I highlighted the expansive naturalism of Fiona Ellis, as it provides the sort of philosophical methodology that is helpful in moving from nontheistic naturalism to one that of necessity includes an account of divine action. Not only might naturalism accommodate an account of divine action, but such a claim need not entail a rejection of scientific knowledge or methodology.