Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
The topic I want to address principally is what exactly philosophers can be expected to contribute to discussions of the foundations of QFT. This of course is part of the broader problem of the relation between science and philosophy generally. I will begin, then, with some general points before turning to more detailed issues with specific reference to QFT.
Philosophy is a second-order activity reflecting on the concepts, methods and fundamental presuppositions of other disciplines, art, politics, law, science and so on, but also, most importantly, examining reflexively its own arguments and procedures. To put it crudely other disciplines may refer to philosophy as a sort of ‘court of appeal’ to resolve foundational disputes (at a sufficient level of generality). But philosophy has to serve as its own court of appeal, to pull itself up by its own bootstraps so to speak.
To many, science is the paradigmatic example of objective, rational, empirically warranted knowledge. So it is to epistemology, the theory of knowledge, that we must turn to examine the credentials of the scientific enterprise. But the first thing to notice about philosophy as compared with science, and in particular physics, is that there is a striking lack of consensus about what knowledge is and how it can be achieved.
To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.