Anxieties of Governance

doi:10.1017/9781108667357.012

Part III - Anxieties of Governance

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 May 2019

Edited by

Frances E. Lee and

Nolan McCarty

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Frances E. Lee: Affiliation:
University of Maryland, College Park
Nolan McCarty: Affiliation:
Princeton University, New Jersey

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Summary

We provide an overview of the concept of the “policyscape,” a dense network of policies that structure the current political order, and then assess its relationship with four aspects of American institutional behavior: the creation of new policies; the maintenance of existing policies and programs; policy “thickening” that may lead to additional gridlock and dysfunction during what is an already laborious lawmaking process; and the monitoring of the current policyscape through executive oversight in Congress. We address, among other questions, why new and broad-reaching policy reforms have been scarce in recent years; why Congress has failed to update extant policies in accordance with social, economic, political, and technological developments; and how partisan polarization has affected Congress’ ability to oversee policy implementation and hold the executive branch accountable for administrative failures.

Keywords

Public policy policy maintenance (or development)policy feedback policyscape oversight bureaucracy bureaucratic politics regulation administrative agencies administrative law delegation political control polarization legislative capacity Constitution separation of powers federalism

Type: Chapter
Information: Can America Govern Itself? , pp. 237 - 344

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108667357.012 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2019

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Part III - Anxieties of Governance

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