Book contents
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Using this Lexicon
- Abbreviations
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- 77. Geometrical Method
- 78. God
- 79. Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von (1749–1832)
- 80. Good and Evil
- 81. Graevius, Johannes Georgius (1632–1703)
- 82. Grotius, Hugo (1583–1645)
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- Q
- R
- S
- T
- U
- V
- W
- Bibliography
- Index of Cross-References
- References
80. - Good and Evil
from G
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 January 2025
Book contents
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Using this Lexicon
- Abbreviations
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- 77. Geometrical Method
- 78. God
- 79. Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von (1749–1832)
- 80. Good and Evil
- 81. Graevius, Johannes Georgius (1632–1703)
- 82. Grotius, Hugo (1583–1645)
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- Q
- R
- S
- T
- U
- V
- W
- Bibliography
- Index of Cross-References
- References
Summary
Spinoza consistently maintained throughout his philosophical career that the terms “good” (bonum) and “bad” (malum) do not refer to intrinsic (non-relational), absolute features of things in the world. There are no individuals or objects or states of affairs in nature that, in and of themselves and without relationship to anything else, are good or bad. As Spinoza states in the Preface to Part Four of the Ethics, “as far as good and evil are concerned, they also indicate nothing positive in things, considered in themselves” (ii/208).
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon , pp. 211 - 217Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024
References
Recommended Reading
Kisner, M. J. (2010). Perfection and desire: Spinoza on the good. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 91, 97–117.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mattern, R. (1978). Spinoza and ethical subjectivism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 8 (Supplement 1), 59–82.Google Scholar
Nadler, S. (2019). Spinoza’s values: Joy, desire, and good in the Ethics. In Naaman-Zauderer, N. (ed.), Freedom, Action, and Motivation in Spinoza’s Ethics (pp. 174–97). Routledge.Google Scholar
Scribano, E. (2012). La connaissance du bien et du mal: Du court traité à l’Éthique. In Jacquet, C. and Moreau, P.-F. (eds.), Spinoza transalpin: Les interprétations actuelles en Italie (pp. 59–78). Publications de la Sorbonne.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Youpa, A. (2010). Spinoza’s theories of value. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 18, 209–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar