Book contents
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Using this Lexicon
- Abbreviations
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- 77. Geometrical Method
- 78. God
- 79. Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von (1749–1832)
- 80. Good and Evil
- 81. Graevius, Johannes Georgius (1632–1703)
- 82. Grotius, Hugo (1583–1645)
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- Q
- R
- S
- T
- U
- V
- W
- Bibliography
- Index of Cross-References
- References
78. - God
from G
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 January 2025
Book contents
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Using this Lexicon
- Abbreviations
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- 77. Geometrical Method
- 78. God
- 79. Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von (1749–1832)
- 80. Good and Evil
- 81. Graevius, Johannes Georgius (1632–1703)
- 82. Grotius, Hugo (1583–1645)
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- Q
- R
- S
- T
- U
- V
- W
- Bibliography
- Index of Cross-References
- References
Summary
In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel offers the following verdict on Spinoza’s ontology: “According to Spinoza what is, is God, and God alone. Therefore, the allegations of those who accuse Spinoza of atheism are the direct opposite of the truth; with him there is too much God” (Hegel 1995, 3.281–82). It is not easy to dismiss Hegel’s grand pronouncement, since Spinoza indeed clearly affirms: “whatever is, is in God [Deo]” (E1p15). Crocodiles, porcupines (and your thoughts about crocodiles and porcupines) are all in God. There is nothing that is not in Spinoza’s God.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon , pp. 206 - 209Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024
References
Recommended Reading
Ariew, R. (1990). The infinite in Spinoza’s philosophy. In Curley, E. & Moreau, P.-F. (eds.), Spinoza: Issues and Directions (pp. 16–31). Brill.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carlisle, C. (2021). Spinoza’s Religion: A New Reading of the Ethics. Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Della Rocca, M. (2002). Spinoza’s substance monism. In Koistinen, O. and Biro, J. (eds.), Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes (pp. 11–37). Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Garrett, D. (1979). Spinoza’s ‘ontological’ argument. Philosophical Review, 88, 198–223.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hegel, G. W. F. (1995). Lectures on the History of Philosophy, ed. Rockmore, T., trans. Haldane, E. S. and Simson, F. H.. University of Nebraska Press.Google Scholar
Melamed, Y. (2022). Spinoza’s metaphysics of substance. In Garrett, D. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, 2nd edn (pp. 61–112). Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Melamed, Y. (2024). Spinoza’s ‘atheism,’ the Ethics and the TTP. In Garber, D. et al. (eds.), Spinoza: Reason, Religion, Politics: The Relation between the Ethics and the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar