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41. - Contentment

from C

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2025

By
Sanem Soyarslan
Edited by
Karolina Hübner  and
Justin Steinberg
Karolina Hübner
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Justin Steinberg
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
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Summary

Spinoza’s most substantive account of contentment (acquiescentia) is found in the Ethics. His discussion of acquiescentia is significant due to the philosophical richness and semantic complexity of this term, which signifies both stillness (quies) and acceptance (acquiescere), as well as self-love (acquiescentia in se ipso). Furthermore, Spinoza defines this polyvalent concept more than once and identifies different kinds of acquiescentia, which are all species of joy that arise when we consider ourselves and our “power of acting” (our capacity to do things autonomously). The differences depend on the kind of cognition that grounds this consideration, together with “the psychological and ethical condition of the person who experiences it” (Carlisle 2017, 210). Examining Spinoza’s account of different kinds of acquiescentia thus provides a better understanding of the complex relationship between his epistemological, ethical, and psychological theories.

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Chapter
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The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon , pp. 102 - 104
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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References

Recommended Reading

Carlisle, C. (2017). Spinoza’s acquiescentia. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 55(2), 209–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rutherford, D. (1999). Salvation as a State Of Mind: The place of acquiescentia in Spinoza’s Ethics. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 7, 447–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Totaro, G. (1994). Acquiescentia dans la cinquième partie de l’Éthique de Spinoza. Revue philosophique de la France et l’etranger, 184, 65–79.Google Scholar
Voss, S. H. (1981). How Spinoza enumerated the affects. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 63, 167–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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