Book contents
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Using this Lexicon
- Abbreviations
- A
- 1. Absolute (Metaphysical)
- 2. Absolute (Political)
- 3. Abstractions and Universals
- 4. Action and Passion
- 5. Adequacy
- 6. Affect
- 7. Affection
- 8. Affirmation
- 9. Agreement
- 10. Ambition
- 11. Animals
- 12. Animation
- 13. Apostle
- 14. Aristocracy
- 15. Attribute
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- Q
- R
- S
- T
- U
- V
- W
- Bibliography
- Index of Cross-References
- References
15. - Attribute
from A
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 January 2025
By
Book contents
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Using this Lexicon
- Abbreviations
- A
- 1. Absolute (Metaphysical)
- 2. Absolute (Political)
- 3. Abstractions and Universals
- 4. Action and Passion
- 5. Adequacy
- 6. Affect
- 7. Affection
- 8. Affirmation
- 9. Agreement
- 10. Ambition
- 11. Animals
- 12. Animation
- 13. Apostle
- 14. Aristocracy
- 15. Attribute
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- Q
- R
- S
- T
- U
- V
- W
- Bibliography
- Index of Cross-References
- References
Summary
Spinoza defines attributes (attributum) thus: “By attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence” (E1def4). We can begin by noting two elements of the definition that make apparent the centrality of attributes to Spinoza’s metaphysics: first, attributes are closely associated with the very essence of substance. Second, attributes are intimately related to the way in which the intellect perceives the essence of substance. In spite of their centrality in Spinoza’s philosophy, there is astonishingly little agreement among scholars as to their nature.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon , pp. 36 - 40Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024
References
Recommended Reading
Curley, E. M. (1988). Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinoza’s Ethics. Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Della Rocca, M. (2012). “Rationalism, idealism, monism, and beyond.” In Förster, E. and Melamed, Y. Y. (eds.), Spinoza and German Idealism (pp. 7–26). Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hübner, K. (2021). “Spinoza on the limits of explanation.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 103(2), 341–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lennon, T. M. (2005). “The rationalist conception of substance.” In Nelson, Alan (ed.), A Companion to Rationalism (pp. 12–30). Blackwell.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lin, M. (2006). “Substance, attribute, and mode in Spinoza.” Philosophy Compass, 1(2), 144–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Melamed, Y. (2013). “Spinoza’s metaphysics of thought: Parallelisms and the multifaceted structure of ideas.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 86(3), 636–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shein, N. (2009). “The false dichotomy between objective and subjective interpretations of Spinoza’s theory of attributes.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 17(3), 505–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shein, N. (2018). “Spinoza’s theory of attributes.” In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/spinoza-attributesGoogle Scholar