Book contents
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Using this Lexicon
- Abbreviations
- A
- 1. Absolute (Metaphysical)
- 2. Absolute (Political)
- 3. Abstractions and Universals
- 4. Action and Passion
- 5. Adequacy
- 6. Affect
- 7. Affection
- 8. Affirmation
- 9. Agreement
- 10. Ambition
- 11. Animals
- 12. Animation
- 13. Apostle
- 14. Aristocracy
- 15. Attribute
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- Q
- R
- S
- T
- U
- V
- W
- Bibliography
- Index of Cross-References
- References
5. - Adequacy
from A
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 January 2025
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Using this Lexicon
- Abbreviations
- A
- 1. Absolute (Metaphysical)
- 2. Absolute (Political)
- 3. Abstractions and Universals
- 4. Action and Passion
- 5. Adequacy
- 6. Affect
- 7. Affection
- 8. Affirmation
- 9. Agreement
- 10. Ambition
- 11. Animals
- 12. Animation
- 13. Apostle
- 14. Aristocracy
- 15. Attribute
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- Q
- R
- S
- T
- U
- V
- W
- Bibliography
- Index of Cross-References
- References
Summary
In the Ethics, Spinoza speaks of “adequate idea” (idea adequata) and “adequate cause” (causa adequata). Spinoza defines these as follows:
By adequate idea I understand an idea which, insofar as it is considered in itself, without relation to an object, has all the properties, or intrinsic denominations of a true idea. Exp.: I say intrinsic to exclude what is extrinsic, namely, the agreement of the idea with its object.
(E2def4)I call that cause adequate whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through it. But I call it partial, or inadequate, if its effect cannot be understood through it alone.
(E3def1)- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon , pp. 14 - 16Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024