Book contents
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Maps
- Contributors to Volume I
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Introduction to Volume I
- 1 China to ad 180
- 2 Teispid and Achaemenid Persia (c. 550–330 bc)
- 3 Ancient Greece
- 4 Philip II, Alexander III and the Macedonian Empire
- 5 Ancient Rome: Monarchy and Republic (753–27 bc)
- 6 China ad 180–1127
- 7 Ancient Rome
- 8 The Gupta Empire (ad 400–500)
- 9 The Sassanian Empire’s Strategies
- 10 The Rashidun, Umayyad (661–750) and Abbasid (750–1258) Caliphates
- 11 Byzantine Strategy (ad 630–1204)
- 12 Strategies in the Wars of Western Europe, 476–c. 1000
- 13 Latin Christendom in the Later Middle Ages
- 14 Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Empire, ad 1206 to 1368
- 15 Hindu and Buddhist Polities of Premodern/Early Modern Mainland South-East Asia (1100–1800)
- 16 Pre-Columbian and Early Historic Native American Warfare
- 17 Ottoman Expansionism, 1300–1823
- 18 Strategy in the Wars of Pre-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa
- 19 Strategies of the Mughal Empire
- 20 China, 1368–1911
- 21 Early Modern Europe: The Habsburgs and Their Enemies, 1519–1659
- 22 Naval Strategies
- 23 The Strategy of Louis XIV
- 24 Hohenzollern Strategy under Frederick II
- 25 American Warfare in the Eighteenth Century
- Summary of Volume I
- Further Reading
- Index
8 - The Gupta Empire (ad 400–500)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 January 2025
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Maps
- Contributors to Volume I
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Introduction to Volume I
- 1 China to ad 180
- 2 Teispid and Achaemenid Persia (c. 550–330 bc)
- 3 Ancient Greece
- 4 Philip II, Alexander III and the Macedonian Empire
- 5 Ancient Rome: Monarchy and Republic (753–27 bc)
- 6 China ad 180–1127
- 7 Ancient Rome
- 8 The Gupta Empire (ad 400–500)
- 9 The Sassanian Empire’s Strategies
- 10 The Rashidun, Umayyad (661–750) and Abbasid (750–1258) Caliphates
- 11 Byzantine Strategy (ad 630–1204)
- 12 Strategies in the Wars of Western Europe, 476–c. 1000
- 13 Latin Christendom in the Later Middle Ages
- 14 Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Empire, ad 1206 to 1368
- 15 Hindu and Buddhist Polities of Premodern/Early Modern Mainland South-East Asia (1100–1800)
- 16 Pre-Columbian and Early Historic Native American Warfare
- 17 Ottoman Expansionism, 1300–1823
- 18 Strategy in the Wars of Pre-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa
- 19 Strategies of the Mughal Empire
- 20 China, 1368–1911
- 21 Early Modern Europe: The Habsburgs and Their Enemies, 1519–1659
- 22 Naval Strategies
- 23 The Strategy of Louis XIV
- 24 Hohenzollern Strategy under Frederick II
- 25 American Warfare in the Eighteenth Century
- Summary of Volume I
- Further Reading
- Index
Summary
The imperial Guptas became the dominant power in India during the fourth and fifth centuries. Though the focus of this chapter will be on Gupta military strategy, I will occasionally peep into grand strategy and tactics. This is because superior tactical elements (horse archery and armoured lancers) allowed the Gupta emperor Chandragupta II to follow an aggressive military strategy. Also, non-military issues which are part of grand strategy (like the fiscal crisis in the mid-fifth century) forced the Gupta emperor Kumaragupta to adopt a passive defensive policy. First, we lay out the scope and objectives of the chapter and analyse the sources available to us for chalking out Gupta strategy. Second, we explore the offensive military strategy which enabled the Guptas to rise from a petty regional polity to the most formidable power in the subcontinent by AD 415. Third, the spotlight is shone on the failure of Gupta defensive strategic policies against the Huns after AD 467. The fourth section discusses the shortcomings of military and non-military strategies followed by the Gupta emperors in maintaining coherence within their domain. The empire was dependent on the co-operation of the samantas (feudatories) and landlords. Further, continuous success against external enemies was essential for maintaining royal supremacy. When the emperors failed against external invaders, then the internal props of royal power started disintegrating. The last section discusses strategic failures against both external and internal enemies which resulted in the collapse of the empire in the last decade of the fifth century.
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- The Cambridge History of Strategy , pp. 171 - 190Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2025