Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-l7hp2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-24T07:47:36.289Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

9 - Separation of Powers

from Part III - Constitutional Principles

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 September 2019

Roger Masterman
Affiliation:
University of Durham
Robert Schütze
Affiliation:
University of Durham
Get access

Summary

‘Separation of powers’ is a concept that is much used, much criticized, but rarely reflected on in contemporary comparative constitutional law.1 Before it can be discussed properly, we have to elaborate some basic distinctions. Separation of powers can be used as a shorthand description of the organization of government as a whole. Political scientists and lawyers have widely applied the notion in this way even though there is nothing distinctively normative about it. The concept can also serve as a legal argument in constitutional reasoning. Both uses are not mutually exclusive; even though the first does not refer to a normative concept, it seems to be helpful for constitutional lawyers who want to analyse the organizational structure of governments. The second one might also help non-legal researchers to understand one important element of constitutional reasoning and both uses can be intertwined on different levels. The legal argument strives to guarantee a certain organization of government, and it is applied by institutions, namely by courts, which are part of this organization. In the academic debate, both uses are often combined. Especially in the American realist tradition, legal arguments are connected with institutional analyses.2 This is fine, but it should be ensured that the argument remains clear about its claims and keeps both levels not necessarily separated, but distinct. As long as there is a methodological difference between ‘comparative constitutional law’ and ‘comparative government’, this distinction will play a role.3

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2019

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Further Reading

B. Ackerman, , ‘New Separation of Powers’ (2000) 113 Harvard Law Review 633.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cameron, M.A., Strong Constitutions (Oxford University Press, 2013).Google Scholar
Kavanagh, A., ‘The Constitutional Separation of Powers’, in Dyzenhaus, D. and Thorburn, M. (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press, 2016).Google Scholar
Kyritsis, D., Where Our Protection Lies (Oxford University Press, 2017).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Möllers, C., The Three Branches (Oxford University Press, 2013).Google Scholar
Napel, H.-M. Ten and Voermans, W. (eds.), The Powers That Be (Leiden University Press, 2016).Google Scholar
Tsebelis, G., Veto-Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton University Press, 2002).Google Scholar
Waldron, J., ‘Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice’ (2013) 54 Boston College Law Review 433.Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×