Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I Overview and Prospects
- Part II Heuristics and Biases: Shortcuts, Errors, and Legal Decisions
- Part III Valuation: Values and Dollars in the Legal System
- 8 Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem
- 9 Assessing Punitive Damages (With Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law)
- 10 Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspective on Pain and Suffering Awards
- 11 Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules
- 12 Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral
- Part IV The Demand for Law: Why Law Is As It Is
- Index
8 - Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I Overview and Prospects
- Part II Heuristics and Biases: Shortcuts, Errors, and Legal Decisions
- Part III Valuation: Values and Dollars in the Legal System
- 8 Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem
- 9 Assessing Punitive Damages (With Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law)
- 10 Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspective on Pain and Suffering Awards
- 11 Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules
- 12 Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral
- Part IV The Demand for Law: Why Law Is As It Is
- Index
Summary
The standard assumptions of economic theory imply that when income effects are small, differences between an individual's maximum willingness to pay for a good (WTP) and minimum compensation demanded for the same entitlement (willingness to accept or WTA) should be negligible. Thus, indifference curves are drawn without reference to current endowments, any difference between equivalent and compensating variation assessments of welfare changes are in practice ignored, and there is wide acceptance of the Coase Theorem assertion that, subject to income effects, the allocation of resources will be independent of the assignment of property rights when costless trades are possible.
The assumption that entitlements do not affect value contrasts sharply with empirical observations of significantly higher selling than buying prices. For example, Thaler found that the minimal compensation demanded for accepting a .001 risk of sudden death was higher by one or two orders of magnitude than the amount people were willing to pay to eliminate an identical existing risk. Other examples of similar reported findings are summarized in Table 8.1. The disparities observed in these examples are clearly too large to be explained plausibly by income effects.
Several factors probably contribute to the discrepancies between the evaluations of buyers and sellers documented in Table 8.1. The perceived illegitimacy of the transaction may, for example, contribute to the extraordinary high demand for personal compensation for agreeing to the loss of a public good. Standard bargaining habits may also contribute to a discrepancy between the stated reservation prices of buyers and sellers.
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- Behavioral Law and Economics , pp. 211 - 231Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2000
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