7 - Equity and the Spoudaios

Summary

Aristotle’s discussion of equity (epieikeia) is perhaps his most influential contribution to jurisprudence. Like the English doctrine of equity it informed, Aristotelian epieikeia is intended to rectify deficiencies arising from the strict application of the letter of the law to all circumstances. The extension of the concept of the ‘decent’ or equitable into the legal domain might nonetheless seem to undermine some of the most desirable features of the rule of law, including impartiality and predictability. In this final chapter, I argue that Aristotle addresses this concern regarding potential arbitrariness by deriving equitable decisions from the rational content of the legislative expert’s judgments. More generally, while the exemplary ethical agent is a measure of practical reasonableness, it is the content of their judgments which ultimately serves as ‘normative bedrock.’ Section 1 examines Aristotle’s use of equity to balance the universality of the law’s pronouncements with the need for adjudicators to assess particular circumstances. Section 2 then turns to Aristotle’s appeal to the judgments of the exemplary practically reasonable agent as a normative criterion and contends that this need not culminate in arbitrariness or decisionism.