Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Foundation: Contractual Imperialism
- 2 Economic Incentives: The Origins of Colonial Autonomy
- 3 Governance Incentives: The Balanced Colonial Constitution
- 4 From Incentives to Institutions: Contractual Imperialism in Practice
- Part II Pivot: Regulatory Imperialism
- References
- Index
- Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
3 - Governance Incentives: The Balanced Colonial Constitution
from Part I - Foundation: Contractual Imperialism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 April 2024
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Foundation: Contractual Imperialism
- 2 Economic Incentives: The Origins of Colonial Autonomy
- 3 Governance Incentives: The Balanced Colonial Constitution
- 4 From Incentives to Institutions: Contractual Imperialism in Practice
- Part II Pivot: Regulatory Imperialism
- References
- Index
- Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
Summary
This chapter explores the terms of letters patent for internal colonial government. It observes that every patent to a private colonizer prescribed a balanced colonial constitution: Some type of independent legislature in the colony, separate from the colonial executive, was to consult on laws and taxes. The chapter presents a strategic model to explain why this served the crown’s interest: An independent colonial legislature could restrain excessive extraction from colonists by colonial executives, which the crown itself – given the distance and its limited capacity – could not do.
Keywords
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- Information
- Agents of EmpireEnglish Imperial Governance and the Making of American Political Institutions, pp. 77 - 125Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024