

attentive to dialect and metre. He notes, for instance, that Doricisms in two stanzas of LXVIII, as against Ionic forms in the others, match the emotional content by echoing Doric lament. He indicates metrical irregularities and explains oddities like XLIII in sota-deans; but he also points to skill in standard versification, as in XV (one spondee in three couplets) and LXVIII (bucolic diaeresis in every hexameter).

Hunter makes no excessive claims about epitaphic poeticity. Language and themes originating in literary poetry (for example, a husband mourning like Admetus: LXVIII; 29–33 treat *Alcestis* and epitaphs) can appear so frequently that Hunter allows for circulating pattern books alongside oral tradition (10–16). Nevertheless, he rightly emphasizes variety, ‘self-conscious play with the traditions and voice of epitaphic poetry’ (116 on XXVII) and a ‘broadening of the scope and ambition’ (27) of post-classical epigrams. One text from Alexandria ‘suggests a poet in touch with the Alexandrian mode’ (89 on XV), while another reflects the contemporary Callimachus (191 on LX). Epitaphs of multiple stanzas or poems rank among the most ambitious: the parts of LXVIII ‘pick up recurrent themes ... there is an emotional narrative running through the whole’ (205). Poetic quality was apparently one criterion for Hunter’s selection from around 5,000 verse epitaphs (2 n.6).

Interesting historical and cultural matters perhaps constituted another criterion. Women’s death in childbirth is sadly frequent: LXV, LXX, LXXVII, LXXX. Race figures prominently in XLV, which commemorates a slave from Nubia by contrasting his ‘dark skin and the “white flowers” of his soul’ (163). Some poems assume a happy afterlife like that of the gold *lamellae* (21–28; XIII, XLII, LXXIX, LXXXI). We find unusual deaths: a boy fallen from a tree (XXXVIII), a murder victim (XLI), a woman who died during a festival (LXXI), a girl struck by lightning (LXXIX) and Pomptilla, who prayed to die in her husband’s place (LXXIV).

This volume provides a good feel for nearly a millennium of Greek epitaphic poetry, its stereotyping beside a capacity to surprise, its linguistic awkwardness beside high poetic quality. Hunter will inspire scholars to dig deeper, teachers to bring these texts into classes and graduate students to realize that, despite all the recent work, inscribed verse holds untapped riches.

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JOHANSEN (T.K.) (ed) **Productive Knowledge in Ancient Philosophy: The Concept of *Technē***. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Pp. xiv + 316. £75.00. 9781108485845.

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This rich volume, deriving from an Oxford conference held in 2015, brings into the lime-light the polysemous notion of *technē* (‘skill’, ‘craft’, ‘art’, ‘expertise’) as it figures in Greek epistemology, ethics, cosmology and metaphysics from Protagoras to Proclus. In 11 chapters and a helpful introduction, it provides an overview of the issues concerning the knowledge involved in expert productive activity. The contributions also reveal points of scholarly disagreement and signpost avenues for further investigation.

The first three chapters focus on Plato’s approach to *technē* against the background of earlier accounts. In Edward Hussey’s view (Chapter 1), Protagoras’ educational project of political expertise is informed by Hippocratic criteria for *technē* status and is grounded in

a Xenophanes-inspired, proto-pragmatic epistemology reliably preserved in Plato's *Theaetetus*. Tamer Nawar (Chapter 2) examines the notion of *technē* emerging in Socrates' exchange with Thrasymachus in the *Republic*, highlighting three of its key features: its being constituted by a two-way ability, its foolproof application by the genuine expert and its orientation towards some good. Rachel Barney (Chapter 3) proceeds from the Protagorean vision of expert deliberation in public and private matters to the expansion upon this idea by Plato's Socrates. Barney attributes to Plato a quasi-deontological model of a disinterested and teleological craft of virtue, rooted in human nature, which plays an architectonic role by governing and expressing itself through our other, elective practical identities.

While Nawar puts emphasis on the continuity of Plato's and Aristotle's views, Barney shows that the craft analogy, properly understood, plays an ongoing role in Plato's dialogues. Barney also reminds us that the ideal craft-expert is exemplified by the Demiurge in the *Timaeus*. This lays some ground for Thomas Kjeller Johansen (Chapter 4) who tackles the question of how the Demiurge's paradigmatic expertise is compatible with his apparent lack of qualification to create mortal beings. Johansen argues that, by delegating the task to the lesser gods, the Demiurge achieves exactly what his expertise requires: he guides the lesser gods to employ a *technē* distinct from his own, thereby completing the best possible cosmic order.

The Demiurge's reasoning, as portrayed in the *Timaeus*, is read by Neoplatonists as rational reconstruction after the fact. Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson (Chapter 10) presents Plotinus' rejection of divine deliberation and reaffirms the originality of his metaphysics of production. Jan Opsomer (Chapter 11) explains how Neoplatonists merge Platonic metaphysical tenets with a Peripatetic analysis of divine *nous*, then explains Proclus' specific stance. Of special interest are the ways in which human *technai* differ from their divine model: they deal not with eternal Forms but with contingent *logoi* invented and transmitted by human experts who deliberate about how to fulfill needs which derive from contingencies of mortal existence.

Ursula Coope (Chapter 5) and Robert Bolton (Chapter 6) offer diverging analyses of Aristotle. Coope argues that all forms of understanding (*epistēmē*) involve grasping explanations. *Technē*, being or involving practical understanding, is no exception, but unlike the demonstrative knowledge of finite items required for theoretical understanding, craft-expertise is essentially open-ended and depends on the genuinely human ability to work out comparative explanations in unprecedented cases. By contrast, Bolton insists on the diversity of Aristotelian *technai*: in contexts labeled 'esoteric' by Bolton, *technē* involves genuine scientific knowledge, while in 'exoteric' contexts, a conception of expertise grounded in experience and memory is sanctioned.

The next three chapters are devoted to post-Aristotelian developments. In what is essentially a long paper divided in two, Voula Tsouna offers an illuminating account of Stoic and Epicurean views concerning everyday *technai* and the specific expertise involved in living a happy life (chapters 7–8). Tsouna highlights the differences and similarities of these rival views by referring to the Platonic antecedent to which they both react. In Chapter 9, Stefan Sienkiewicz looks at Sextus Empiricus. He argues that, on the one hand, the Modes in which the ability constitutive of Pyrrhonism, that of setting out equipollent oppositions, manifests itself defy systematization but, on the other hand, Sextus sees them as productive of a happy life. As a result, Sienkiewicz claims, Sextus himself could reasonably take his argument to satisfy one of two recognized criteria for being a *technē*. This suggestion could be further developed by dealing with the context of the peculiar Pyrrhonist claim to happiness, the polemical appropriation of Stoic criteria for *technē*, and the precarious difficulties facing any Pyrrhonist with the audacity to offer a positive account of anything other than their appearances.

The volume is essential reading to anyone interested in Greek philosophical reflections on *technē*. Those with a pre-existing interest are likely to come away invigorated; others

might find themselves looking at old problems from a refreshing angle. Apart from small hiccups (for example, a claim featuring twice on p. 53 and n30; read 'became' for 'because' in *Tim.* 42d–e quoted on p. 42), the volume is carefully edited. Readers are assisted by a bibliography, general index and *index locorum*.

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JOHO (T.) **Style and Necessity in Thucydides**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. xi + 354. £90. 9780198812043.
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This work, very well organized by titled chapters and sections, is available as a physical book (pricey, and not particularly easy to find in libraries in my area) and in an online version where each chapter is helpfully preceded by an abstract. I will therefore dispense with a systematic summary, and rather focus on some of the features and details I find most valuable. In the introduction and throughout the book, a survey of the criticisms and rewritings of Thucydides' prose by Dionysius of Halicarnassus is both useful and very enjoyable to read (I will make Dionysius a required assignment in my seminar). It brings vividly to the fore the shocking oddities of the style of certain parts of the historian's work, and in particular his insistent use of nominal constructions that emphasize process over agency and leave deliberately unclear who is performing the actions. These problematic periphrases, defined and illustrated with numerous quotations, occur disproportionately in the parts that Joho calls 'excursus' (not a felicitous term, in my opinion), as opposed to the 'narrative', which rather tends to conform to the more common features of Greek prose style, including personal or concrete subjects, active constructions and sthenic verbs (verbs with a specific semantic content). Joho devotes special attention to the style of Thucydides' analysis of stasis ('excursus') in comparison to the plain register of his report of the events of the revolution in Corcyra. Without regard to the specific context, let's take as an example among many the following excerpt in the helpful literal translation offered by Joho: 'the events that came later, through realization, I suppose, of what had happened before, carried the extravagance in the invention of new schemes still much further' (3.82.3). Here a disastrous and broad cultural change (the exacerbation of violence in Greece resulting from the combination of civil struggle and war) is envisioned as just happening, independently from the initiatives of the individuals or collectivities that participated in it. Similarly, Thucydides' Archaeology (discussed in Chapter 3) privileges the semantics of process over those of action by the frequent use of the asthenic verbs γίνομαι ('to happen') and ἵστημι ('to establish') and compounds, the impersonal subject 'Greece', abstract nouns like δύναμις ('power') and other general expressions, nominalized neuter adjectives and participles, and passive forms (for example, 1.7, 8.2, 13.1, pages 82–83). The emphasis on settled conditions resulting in predictable reactions is also conspicuous in the style of those speeches (for example, 1.75.3, 4, pages 90–93) that most seem to agree with the analyses provided by Thucydides in his own voice such as his representation in the Pentecontaetia of the almost involuntary growth of the Athenians' power after the Persian Wars thanks to the impersonal forces represented by ships, money and walls (93–97).

If Joho's analysis sometimes runs the risk of being excessively subtle, it nevertheless always raises interesting questions about Thucydides' stylistic choices (for example, 97–99: what is the function of the added subject αὐτοί, 'they themselves', at 1.118.2?).