Although development in China is quite heterogeneous across regions, little research has explored how the value of Chinese firms’ political ties is contingent on the institutional and economic development of firms’ regional environment. This article explores some of the factors that moderate the benefit of political ties, differentiating between ties to central and local government. The study investigates how benefits of ties to central and local government are moderated by regional market and economic development, respectively. The study is based on a quantitative analysis of 858 listed Chinese firms. The results suggest that firms enjoy a positive effect of political ties but mainly ties to central government. The analysis, furthermore, finds these ties to be less valuable in economically well-developed regions. Market development, on the other hand, does not moderate the effects of local or central government ties.

China's state-guided economic miracle has revitalized a long-standing and unsettled debate about the role of government in transformative economic development. In a firm-level study of corporate governance we examine whether direct state involvement actually makes a positive contribution to the economic performance of newly incorporated firms in China's urban economy. We show that direct intervention into the governance of firms is likely to yield negative economic effects at the firm level. We infer from our findings that it must be other types of government intervention external to the firm that explain the success of China's developmental state in promoting rapid economic growth.